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Abstract 
TEACHER MERIT PAY IN A RURAL WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA COUNTY: A 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF STUDENT CHARACTERISTICS 
ON A TEACHER’S LIKELIHOOD OF RECEIVING A MONETARY BONUS IN MATH 
OR READING IN GRADES THREE - EIGHT 
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Dissertation Committee Chairperson: Les Bolt, Ph.D. 
   
This quantitative work is an exploratory study that examines the bonus pay 
structure enacted by the North Carolina General Assembly in the 2016-2017 
academic year for teachers in grades three through eight in reading and math.  The 
study used student data collected from an LEA in a rural western North Carolina 
county from the 2017-2018 academic year.  The study and logistic regression analyze 
the validity of the EVAAS value-added tool used in North Carolina to identify those 
educators that rose to the top 25% of teachers in the state in their ability to impact 
student learning in the affected grade levels and subject areas.  With the non-random 
assignment of students into elementary and middle school classrooms and the 
corresponding peer effects that either lift or retard student learning, the study 
examined student characteristics to find any correlation between a teacher receiving 
 
	 v	
the merit-based bonus and the composition of students in her classroom.  The study 
identified that white, mixed-race and Asian students have a greater likelihood of 
sitting in a teacher’s classroom that received the reading bonus.  Students with 
disabilities had a negative correlation to a teacher’s likelihood of receiving the 
reading bonus in grades three - five.  In math, the study found a negative correlation 
between teachers receiving the bonus and the placement of both students with 
disabilities and students labeled as gifted learners in their classrooms.  There was a 
positive correlation between teachers receiving the math bonus and students that are 
mixed-race, Hispanic and African-American.  The study might be used to help inform 
student classroom assignment practices in North Carolina in light of a current merit-
based pay legislation that is rewarding teachers for the growth they achieve with the 
students they serve.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Teacher evaluation is not a perfect science.  Although researchers have found that the 
teacher is the most important school-based variable affecting student learning, administrators 
have struggled to evaluate teachers in a way that discriminates between the most and least 
effective (Marzano, Pickering & Pollock, 2001; Weisberg, Sexton, Mulhern & Keeling, 
2009; Sanders, Wright, & Horn, 1997).  In most school districts, teacher evaluation is a 
notoriously subjective exercise that is rarely directly linked to student achievement (Braun, 
2005).  Done correctly, teacher evaluation should be used to identify the most effective 
teachers for continued employment, and to discover areas where professional development is 
needed.  The most accurate teacher observations appear to be those conducted by an outside 
agent who is not biased by day-to-day contact with the teacher (Whitehurst, Chingos, & 
Lindquist, 2015).  However, smaller school districts and those in poorer communities often 
cannot afford the personnel to complete these outside observations.  The challenge then for 
public school administrators, district school offices, and state departments of education is to 
find some level of objective measurement concerning what constitutes effective teaching 
practices.  And of equal importance is the ability to utilize this measurement tool to identify 
effective and ineffective teachers for purposes of merit pay, teacher retention, staff 
development, and teacher dismissal (Weisberg et al., 2009).  
The history of education reform resembles a pendulum that swings between absolute 
autonomy of the classroom teacher to over-prescribed instructional methods derived in part 
from the scientific management practices advocated by Frederick Taylor in the early 20th 
century.  Taylor believed that if managers simplify tasks into their smallest components, 
overall production improves (Ireh, 2016).  Applied to academia, in order to maximize 
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production (student results), the outputs must be measurable so that the efficient workers 
(teachers) can be recognized and rewarded, the least effective dismissed (Gray, 1993).  
Professionals in the educational field believe that the results of student assessment can be 
used to determine whether students have mastered the curriculum, and their teachers have 
been effective at their craft.   
A growing debate exists, however, concerning what student testing reveals about 
teacher effectiveness.  On one side are those that want to assign accountability to teachers as 
measured by the growth of their students on End of Grade (EOG) and End of Course (EOC) 
tests (Ballou, Sanders, & Wright, 2004; Race to the Top, 2011).  On the other side of the 
debate are those who worry about the validity of these accountability tools and the historical 
tendency of state and federal legislative mandates to over-regulate classroom teaching 
(Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2010; Collins & Amrein-Beardsley, 2014; Darling-Hammond, 
Amrein-Beardsley, & Rothstein, 2012).   
When it comes to using standardized test scores to hold public school teachers 
accountable, several questions arise.  What kind of measurements of teacher performance 
should the public expect?  If teacher observations and evaluations are subjective in nature, 
what measurement tools can education leaders incorporate in the evaluation process that will 
insure that students are gaining what they need year by year to be successful in a civil society 
(Whitehurst, Chingos, & Lindquist, 2015)?  Are the tools that are currently being used to 
measure student academic growth and teacher impact sufficiently valid and reliable to meet 
their intended purpose (Amrein-Beardsley, 2014)?  
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Competing Paradigms 
The search for a reliable tool for measuring teacher effectiveness is laudable.  Finding 
the right one, or even one that accurately reflects teacher effectiveness based on student test 
scores is not easy, and may ultimately be impossible.  Of the Value-Added-Measures 
(VAMs) on the market, Wiley (2006) discusses six that he alternately refers to as Value-
Added-Assessments (VAAs) being used by states and districts across the country. 
• Simple gain score models (e.g., Texas Growth Index) 
• Covariate adjustment models (e.g., Dallas Value Added Assessment System or 
“DVAAS”) 
• William Sanders’s layered models (e.g., Educational Value Added Assessment 
System or “EVAAS”; Tennessee Value Added Assessment System or “TVAAS”) 
• Cross-classified models 
• Rand’s persistence model 
• Todd and Wolpin’s cumulative within-child mixed-effects model (p. 3). 
North Carolina adopted the Sanders’ EVAAS model in 2001 to measure the impact 
teachers have on student learning, often referred to simply as growth.  For the purposes of 
discussion going forward, growth is the amount of academic progress a student makes in a 
year of study (Cody, McFarland, Moore & Preston, 2010).  Since its adoption, the North 
Carolina EVAAS tool has been deluged with a mountain of critical literature that debates the 
accuracy of any VAM model, especially those that may be used to make high stake decisions 
about teacher evaluation, compensation and termination (Amrein-Beardsley, 2014).  Many 
value-added-model critics believe that no value-added model or methodology is sufficiently 
robust to measure teacher effectiveness.  These VAM critics purport that no level of 
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mathematical modeling is sophisticated enough to isolate the value a teacher has on the 
learning of one child or classroom (Baker et al., 2010.)   
A contrary opinion on the validity of VAMs arises from various state legislatures and 
VAM creators that claim to measure accurately student growth.  As referenced previously, 
these models consist of the Education Value-Added Assessment System (EVAAS), the 
Milwaukee model, and the Dallas model to name a few (Cody et al., 2010) (Appendix A).   
The Dallas and Milwaukee school districts use value-added models that differ from 
EVAAS in their use of demographic data.  In addition to test scores, these two models 
incorporate information on student characteristics, such as race and income level. In 
both cases, the researchers who developed these models have specified that the 
models are to be used for measuring teacher and school effectiveness, not for setting 
performance standards. (Cody et al., 2010, p.3) 
These student growth models use complex statistical techniques to isolate the influence of 
individual school districts, schools, and teachers on student achievement (Meyer & 
Dokumaci, 2010).  
 Used in North Carolina since 2001, EVAAS gages the impact teachers have on 
improving student outcomes as measured on end of year state assessments (ABCs of Public 
Education, 2006).  In addition to its usage in North Carolina, several other states and 
municipalities across the country utilize the EVAAS growth measure (known by other 
acronyms in different states) to measure teacher effectiveness. In the succeeding chapters, I 
will present arguments in favor of and in opposition to the use of value-added methodology 
in making high stakes decisions including merit pay, teacher evaluation, and employment 
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decisions, referencing a myriad of studies in the literature available on the validity and 
reliability of value-added-models. 
Problem Statement 
In a search for objectivity in the process of evaluating teacher effectiveness, states 
have turned to value-added models to assign growth values to their teachers.  According to 
the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction’s (NCDPI) closeout report of 2015, the 
state has made strides to make possible every educator’s ability to receive a “fair, rigorous, 
data-based evaluation of his or her effectiveness that includes specific feedback to fuel 
professional growth” (NCDPI, 2015, p. 14).  In part by adopting the EVAAS value-added 
measure, North Carolina received a federal Race to the Top (RttT) grant of close to $400 
million in 2010 as one of the grant’s original 12 recipients (Klein 2014; NCDPI, 2015).  As 
part of their grant application, NCDPI agreed to rate teacher effectiveness on a three-year 
rolling average that began in 2014-15.  This rolling average became Standard 6 in the teacher 
evaluation tool and was to be used to measure teacher effectiveness over a three-year period 
in order to achieve a more complete picture of a teacher’s effectiveness (Appendix B).  
According to the North Carolina Teacher Evaluation Process (2015) crafted by the North 
Carolina Department of Public Instruction: 
Standard VI: Teachers Contribute to the Academic Success of Students.  The work of 
the teacher results in acceptable, measurable progress for students based on 
established performance expectations using appropriate data to demonstrate growth. 
(p. 5) 
The data from three years of teacher impact on student growth as measured by 
EVAAS would designate a teacher as performing at one of three levels: Highly Effective, 
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Effective, or Needs Improvement (NCDPI, 2015, p. 6).  Until 2017, teachers were able to see 
data on the North Carolina Educator Effectiveness System (NCEES) evaluation site and 
access their three-year effectiveness rating based on the average of their three-year growth 
indexes as calculated in EVAAS.  However, in 2017, the state ended the practice of rating 
teacher effectiveness using the three-year rolling average.  Year by year teacher growth 
numbers are still housed in the Educator Evaluation Dashboard in the EVAAS web platform 
and can be accessed by the teachers and the administrators for whom these teachers work 
(NCDPI, 2015).   
 Although “Standard 6” is no longer a part of the teacher evaluation instrument, a 
teacher’s impact on student growth as measured by EVAAS in now a part of the North 
Carolina teacher bonus compensation package.  For all states trying to apply for RttT money, 
it was required that they provide in their grant applications a methodology that would 
identify the state’s most and least effective teachers. The intent of the federal legislation was 
to encourage states to identify objectively their most impactful teachers.  This is precisely 
what EVAAS and other VAMs claim to do. 
Teacher Compensation Plans   
With student performance as the goal, North Carolina has taken steps since 2014 to 
revamp its teacher compensation plan by placing less emphasis on years of service and 
degrees earned and instead choosing to reward teachers for the growth of their students (NC 
House Bill 840, 2017).  Starting	with the 2016-17 school year, the top 25% of public school 
teachers, as measured by their EVAAS growth index in grades 3-8, began earning incentive 
bonuses for growing their students.  Legislation was passed in the North Carolina General 
 
	 7	
Assembly that was to motivate teachers and reward those that most impacted student 
learning.  According to Eckert and Dabrowski (2010): 
The current teacher compensation system is obsolete. On that point, there appears to 
be wide agreement. Virtually every new idea for improving teacher compensation 
focuses on how to tie teacher pay to teacher effectiveness as measured by improving 
student learning. (p. 88) 
 In light of the weight being attributed to the EVAAS growth measure to evaluate 
teachers and assess student growth, it is reasonable to ask about their accuracy, most 
especially because of the high stakes decisions being made around teacher compensation, 
teacher employment and principal placement (Goldring, Grissom, Rubin, Neumerski, 
Cannata, Drake, & Schuermann, 2015).  	
Using EVAAS measures to make high stakes decisions about teacher compensation 
and retention was not the intent of value-added modeling at its inception.  Rather, Sanders 
and Horn reported in 1998 that the purpose of the EVAAS tool was not to make high stakes 
decisions, but to allow teachers the ability to reflect and improve on their teaching. 
A qualitative study conducted by Collins and Amrein-Beardsley (2012) revealed 
however, that teachers have an inherent distrust of the EVAAS instrument due to the VAMs 
lack of transparency.  Can EVAAS results mitigate the “peer effect” that other researchers 
have found to lead to higher student scores or lower student scores independent of the 
classroom teacher (Burke & Sass, 2013; Hanushek, Kain, Markman, & Rivkin, 2003; 
Sacerdote, 2011)?  Can EVAAS account for “spillage,” the phenomena of a teacher’s 
effectiveness rating being contaminated by the influence of another teacher or tutor on a 
student’s performance and growth (Corcoran, 2010; Koedel 2009, Yuan, 2015)?  Should 
 
	 8	
teachers be blamed for lower student growth when summer learning loss occurs (Darling-
Hammond et. al, 2012; Harris, 2010)?  Can EVAAS account for the preponderance of 
English as a second language learners in a classroom or academically gifted students being 
hindered by the “ceiling effect” with their end of year assessments (Collins & Amrein-
Beardsley, 2014; Sanders & Horn, 1998)?  Can any VAM model reflect teacher effectiveness 
accurately when students are not randomly assigned to classrooms (Burns & Mason, 1995; 
Paufler & Amrein-Beardsley, 2014, Baker et al., 2010)?  This study will explore whether 
there are student characteristics that may inhibit a teacher’s ability to achieve higher EVAAS 
indexes precluding any bonuses the state of North Carolina will award to the top 25% of 
teachers in grades three through eight (Ballou, Sanders, & Wright, 2004).  Are all teachers 
equally able to earn a merit-based bonus in spite of the differing characteristics of the 
students in their classrooms (Eckert & Dabrowski, 2010)? 
Purpose 
The focus of this study is to determine whether characteristics of students in a North 
Carolina teacher’s classroom – by subject area and grade – have an effect on that teacher’s 
ability to finish in the top 25% of EVAAS scores.  When it comes to educating students, the 
end should always be an improvement in student performance (Guskey, 2017). It is 
imperative that North Carolina teachers understand the system that is evaluating their 
teaching effectiveness and that the instrument used to measure student academic growth is a 
valid and reliable instrument.  
 In North Carolina, EVAAS is the value-added-model the state has adopted to measure 
a teacher’s impact on the learning of her students.  Put simply, is EVAAS an appropriate tool 
for measuring teacher effectiveness?  Ballou and Springer (2015) found evidence that in 
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states where EVAAS is used, teachers failed to claim students in roster verification 
appropriately if they were low performers, and found also that teachers were coaching (if not 
cheating) at a statistically significant level when teachers were in charge of testing their own 
students.  In addition, since EVAAS does not consider student demographic or socio-
economic variables in their growth model, one must ask if the model that is calculating 
teacher growth indexes is a fair measure in light of the fact that demographics and student 
characteristics are not specifically included in the growth calculations.  Are there specific 
student characteristics that are likely to unduly burden or advantage a teacher’s effectiveness 
measure, resulting in her receiving or not receiving merit pay for student achievement in 
grades three through five reading and four through eight math?  Based on the Guskey 
framework (2017), do these monetary incentives lead to better student learning outcomes 
across North Carolina? 
The purpose of this study is to test EVAAS’ claim that the teacher growth model, 
despite being void of student demographic and socio-economic considerations, and based 
solely on individual student testing histories, is sufficiently robust to accurately reflect 
teacher effectiveness in a set of rural elementary and middle schools in western North 
Carolina, where students are non-randomly assigned to classrooms and where teacher 
bonuses are tied to their EVAAS performance.  
Research Question 
In a 2009 article, William Sanders teamed up with Jill G. Leandro, June C. Rivers, 
and  S. Paul Wright, to respond to seven common concerns levied at EVAAS about its ability 
to reflect accurately teacher effectiveness.  The seven concerns the authors chronicled 
provide context for the two (in bold) that are germane to this discussion and study.  
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1. Value-added models rely on standardized tests, which have limitations themselves 
2. Missing student test data jeopardize the validity of the analyses 
3. Potential for rewards and punishments is related to class size (shrinkage 
estimation) 
4. SAS EVAAS does not adjust for socioeconomic factors 
5. SAS EVAAS modeling lacks transparency and is too complex 
6. SAS EVAAS statistical methods and algorithms have not been peer reviewed 
7. SAS EVAAS predictions of student performance are not verified later (emphasis 
mine). 
McCaffrey, Han and Lockwood (2008) found that the shrinkage estimation that 
EVAAS and other multivariate models use helps to limit the strong effects that outliers may 
have on a teacher’s results when her class size is small.  Sanders et al. (2009) responded to 
other criticisms about their model not adjusting for socio-economic or demographic 
variables.  Sanders et al. (2009) offered that what the EVAAS model does include is a 
student’s entire testing history in multiple subjects (multivariate) over multiple years 
(longitudinal) (p.3).  At the student level, by including all of his testing history, each student 
serves as his own control (Sander et al., 2009).  Both Ballou et al. (2004) and Lockwood and 
McCaffrey (2007) confirm Sanders’ claims in their research of his EVAAS model.  Sanders 
et al. (2009) include in the defense of their model a thought-provoking statement: 
On a philosophical level, the question educators should ask is whether they should 
have lower expectations for a student from a poor family than one from a rich family, 
even when the two students have identical test scores and academic histories. By 
adjusting for these variables, one is directly assuming that there will be different 
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expectations for two students with the same prior achievement pattern who come 
from different SES/DEM communities. (p. 3) 
Sanders and his colleagues admit that there is a strong correlation between socio-
economic variables, minority demographics and achievement scores, but they challenge the 
notion that growth measures have the same negative correlation with these same variables 
(Sanders et al., 2009, p.4).  Sanders et al. (2009) also provide an explanation for why lower 
EVAAS scores seem to go to teachers in schools serving more impoverished communities.  
Schools with higher proportions of poor and minority students have been documented to 
contain fewer seasoned and accomplished teachers, and that strong teachers often leave these 
schools for higher paying teaching jobs where student poverty is not as prevalent (Mayer, 
Mullens, & Moore, 2000; Sanders et al., 2009). 
However, many researchers find that Sanders underestimates what is going on in 
these socio-economic areas where low SES students are concentrated in teachers’ 
classrooms.  The positive peer effects documented by Hanushek, Kain, Markman, and Rivkin 
(2003) for students lucky enough to be with the academically gifted student cluster and the 
teachers who reap the growth rewards are not figured into the EVAAS model, nor are the 
negative peer effects when clusters of low achieving students populate a classroom (Burke & 
Sass, 2013; Sacerdote, 2011).  Does EVAAS present a model sufficiently complex to handle 
the lack of random student assignment in most classrooms in America’s public schools 
(Braun, 2005; Kupermintz, Shepard, & Linn, 2001; Newton, Darling-Hammond, Haertel, & 
Thomas, 2010; Pauffler & Amrein-Beardsley, 2012)?  Understanding which of these 
competing ideas are correct carries significance for North Carolina’s public schools. If the 
stated goal of the North Carolina Legislature is to improve teaching practices and student 
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learning by employing monetary incentives for North Carolina’s public school teachers, one 
must ask if the EVAAS tool is a fair way to determine the most effective teachers in our 
grades three through eight classrooms, in spite of the fact that teacher rewards are being 
meted out without consideration to the characteristics of the students sitting in non-randomly 
assigned classrooms.  The research question that emerges from this VAM and student 
characteristic discussion is as follows: Is the likelihood of a North Carolina teacher receiving 
incentive pay impacted by the student characteristics prevalent in his/her classroom? 
Setting of the Study 
I will be working with data from 15 elementary schools and six middle schools in a 
rural western North Carolina school district where close to 62% of the students in grades 
three through eight in the study are served by the federal Free and Reduced Lunch program.  
The English as a Second Language (ESL) program serves about nine percent of the students.  
Close to five percent of the students are African American, and another five percent identify 
as mixed race.  Sixty-five percent are white – non-Hispanic.  Approximately six percent are 
Asian and seventeen percent are Hispanic.  About seventeen percent of the students are 
served by the Exceptional Children’s (special education) program.  Close to seventeen 
percent are also served by the Academically Gifted Program (Table 3.1). 
Methodology 
The methodology will involve using logistic regression modeling to discover if 
teacher growth, which determines teachers eligible for state-appropriated merit bonuses, 
meted out to teachers in grades three through eight in a rural North Carolina public school 
district, is adversely affected by the demographics and relative poverty of the students in 
teachers’ classrooms.  Based on data availability, I will build the regression model with the 
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following variables that are available through the NCDPI Accountability website and the 
state’s secure shell available to district administrators.  The student variables I will use to 
create the regression models include:  
• Asian students 
• African American students 
• Hispanic students 
• Native American students 
• Mixed race students 
• Pacific Islander students 
• White/Non-Hispanic students 
• Males/Females 
• Students served by the Academically Gifted program 
• Students in the Exceptional Children’s program (special education) 
• Economically disadvantaged students identified by their enrollment in the free and 
reduced lunch program 
• English as a second language students	
I will identify student characteristics and classroom population clusters that would 
more likely lead to a teacher receiving or not receiving a bonus for being in the top 25% of 
EVAAS growth indices. 
Significance 
Currently, 25% of public school teachers across North Carolina teaching math in 
grades four through eight, and reading in grades three through five, are given annual 
incentive bonuses upwards of $7000 for effectively growing their students’ academic 
 
	 14	
achievement as measured by the value-added measurement tool, EVAAS.  Discovering if 
there is bias inherent in the instrument due to the prevalence of certain student characteristics 
in teachers’ classrooms would be of significance to teachers themselves and those legislators 
who believe that these bonuses can drive teachers to excel in improving student performance 
on North Carolina EOG tests.  Despite criticisms levied at EVAAS for  high stakes decisions 
based upon its teacher effectiveness results −	specifically the effect of non-randomly 
assigned students and peer effects on EVAAS teacher indices, I have found no research 
examining the impact of student characteristics on the North Carolina incentives program and 
the likelihood of teachers achieving a bonus based on their EVAAS results.  Furthermore, if 
policy makers at the state level want to be good stewards of taxpayer dollars, they should 
know if their teacher bonus plan is having the desired effect of improving student educational 
outcomes. 
Connections 
Being in education for 25 years in the role of teacher substitute, classroom social 
studies teacher, basketball, baseball, lacrosse, and cross country coach, assistant principal, 
principal, and a director of testing and accountability, I have worked with the EVAAS 
growth tool on several levels.  I currently provide trainings to school level administrators, 
instructional coaches and teachers on the use of EVAAS to enhance instructional practices so 
that student learning is improved.  I have a stake in understanding if the work holds up to the 
scrutiny of research and to the results generated by this study. 
Definition of Terms 
Binary Variable – A categorical variable that can take on exactly two values is termed a 
binary variable or dichotomous variable. 
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Blocking – When a student’s testing history completely accounts for his SES/DEM factors, 
in effect, blocking out the need to include these variables in a VAM model. 
Categorical Variable – These are variables that take on one or a limited and usually fixed 
number of possible values, assigning each unit of observation to a nominal category. 
Ceiling Effect - The inability of students at the highest achievement levels to show growth 
due to their previous test scores being at the top of the percentile rankings. 
Descriptive Research Design – A quantitative research design wherein a subject is 
measured once and where the researcher is looking only to establish relationships among 
variables, not to establish causality. 
Experimental Research Design - A type of quantitative research where subjects are 
measured before and after a treatment.  The researcher is trying to establish causality 
between variables. 
Exploratory Research – Research conducted for a problem that must be studied more 
clearly, intended to establish priorities and improve the final research design. 
Growth – The amount of gain a student, classroom, or teacher makes in a given year 
compared to the average growth made by students across the state on a prescribed curriculum 
Logistic regression - regression analysis used when the dependent variable is dichotomous 
(binary).  Logistic regression describes data and explains the relationship between one 
dependent binary variable and one or more nominal or ordinal independent variables, by 
computing odds ratios. 
Low Performing School – In the 2001 ABC’s of North Carolina model, this designation was 
for schools that did not meet at least expected growth and had fewer than 50% of its students 
performing at grade level (achievement level III). 
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Merit Pay – The idea of rewarding teachers with monetary incentives for their impact on 
student learning rather than for years of service or degrees earned. 
Nominal Variable – Variables with two or more categories not having any kind of natural 
order or numeric value. 
Peer Effect – The effect, positive or negative, that a group of students may have on their 
fellow students’ academic performance. 
Principal-agent theory – In education, pay for performance runs the risk of the agent, the 
principal in this case, working to maximize student outcomes even though they are not 
perfectly aware of everything the teacher, the principal in this case, is doing to grow their 
students’ academic acumen. 
Scientific Management Theory (Taylorism) - The application of industrial engineering 
principles to create a system where waste is avoided, the process and method of production is 
improved, and goods are fairly distributed.  
Spillage - A phenomena in education statistics where a teacher gains the advantage or 
disadvantage of student growth based on the value another teacher adds to that student’s 
learning. 
Status Model - A model that reports the percentage of students scoring “proficient” on a 
standardized test.  Also known as a proficiency model. 
Student Growth – The amount of academic progress a student makes in a school year. 
Student Proficiency – The measure of student performance against a defined level of 
achievement. 
Value-Added-Model (Measure) - VAMs calculate a measure of change, or the value added 
to a student’s learning over a period of time on the basis of her growth on a standardized test. 
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Organization of Study  
This study begins with an introduction of the problem, the research question, and the 
setting and significance of the study involving value-added-models and the North Carolina 
teacher bonus structure for teachers in grades three through eight.  The second chapter 
examines the literature and informs the study regarding merit pay, EVAAS critiques, 
EVAAS defenses, the randomization or lack thereof concerning student assignment to 
classrooms, and the peer effects that influence student learning.  Chapter three outlines the 
explorative quantitative methodology employed in the study.  Chapter four examines the 
results of the quantitative methods and Chapter five provides concluding thoughts about the 
study and ideas for further research. 
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
Introduction 
In 1965, Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty initiatives paved the way for an 
educational funding source designed to target early elementary reading.  Title I funding 
became an integral component of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) that 
would be used for early grade reading intervention in an attempt to close the achievement 
gap between rich and poor (Klein, 2015).  Despite the billions of dollars allocated to the Title 
I program, the educational achievement gap has not been resolved.  In 1983, the U.S. 
Department of Education released a scathing report called a Nation at Risk.  The rhetoric in 
this report discredited the nation’s public schools and the achievement of its students as 
compared to the rest of the world.  The report found academic rigor lacking in America’s 
public schools.  Based on the findings of the report, a Nation at Risk facilitated a public 
conversation about which students should be finishing high school and matriculating to 
college.  According to the report, no longer should universities be reserved for the American 
elites.  College and universities should be accessible to a much larger percentage of the 
American student population (Guthrie & Ray, 2008).   
The political authority that would be responsible for facilitating structural change to 
the American educational system based on the Nation at Risk’s findings was the next 
conversation the nation needed to have.  In the mid 1980’s, the political authority for 
operating the nation’s public schools was shared by the state and local governments.  The 
state and municipal governments were primarily responsible for funding and directing policy 
for the public schools within the American system of federalism (Manna, 2006). In this vein, 
North Carolina was one of the first states to start looking at accountability for its public 
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schools and teachers.  To this end, the state began creating state assessments aligned to its 
curricula to start the accountability process in the 1980’s and 1990’s.  
History of Testing in North Carolina 
As the state of North Carolina’s General Assembly pondered the idea of academic 
rigor and improving student graduation rates some 40 years ago, legislation was introduced 
that became the first formalized steps in North Carolina to assess student content mastery by 
measuring student proficiency through standardized testing.   The General Assembly passed 
legislation in 1984 and 1989 that required the North Carolina Department of Public 
Instruction (NCDPI) to develop a core curriculum and evaluative assessments to gauge 
student progress.  The first End of Grade (EOG) tests were rolled out in 1989.  The tests were 
redesigned with educator input in 1992-1993 and then frequent test re-norming and 
curriculum updates occurred in subsequent years.  In addition to the end-of-year assessments, 
the state created scale scores and the more familiar achievement levels for EOG tests and 
End of Course (EOC) tests.  Four standards of achievement were ascribed to measure student 
success.  
• Level I - Students performing at this level do not have sufficient mastery or 
knowledge and skills of the course or subject area to be successful in the next 
grade or content area. 
• Level -II - Students performing at this level demonstrate inconsistent mastery of 
knowledge and skills in this subject or content area and are minimally prepared to 
be successful at the next grade or content area. 
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• Level III - Students performing at this level consistently demonstrate mastery of 
grade level and content area subject matter and skills and are prepared for the next 
grade level or content area. 
• Level IV - Students performing at this level consistently perform in a superior 
manner clearly beyond that required to be proficient at grade level and content 
level work. (“ABC Program Information,” 2006)  
In 1995, The North Carolina General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 16 directing the 
State Board of Education (SBE) to examine the administrative organization of the 
Department of Public Instruction (DPI) so that they might propose a plan for reorganization 
(“ABC Program Information,” 2006). The resulting plan was entitled the ABC’s of Public 
Education.  The ABC’s went into effect in North Carolina in 1996.  With the creation of the 
North Carolina’s ABC’s of Public Education, the state required that schools annually report 
to the public two primary student accountability measures.  Students scoring an achievement 
level of 3 or 4 on the EOG and EOC tests were grade-level or subject-level proficient.  
Unfortunately, by relying solely upon student test-proficiency percentages, North Carolina 
originally overlooked student growth in the respective grade levels or subject areas (Lachlan-
Hache & Castro, 2015, p.3).   From the outset, the ABC’s of public education incentivized 
school performance (the percentage of students scoring levels 3 and 4 on EOG and EOC 
assessments) by granting financial rewards to schools for student test score excellence.  
However, the ABC’s also provided consequences for not reaching state-prescribed 
goals.  Schools designated as “Low-Performing Schools” were those that did not meet 
expected growth and had fewer than 50% of their students meeting an achievement level of 3 
or above on EOG and EOC testing (ABC Program Information, 2006).  Assistance teams 
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from the state would be assigned to these schools to affect the change needed to grow student 
assessment scores.  After a year of intervention, the team might recommend teacher and/or 
principal termination if appropriate steps were not taken to improve the school’s achievement 
and growth results (NCDPI, 2001).  In 2000 and 2001, in response to Congress’s Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Bush administration’s reauthorization of 
ESSA–the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), North Carolina began formally assessing all 
students including those identified as exceptional children, those participating in special 
education programs (NCDPI 2001).  The bill gained support with both Republican and 
Democratic politicians as national concerns again arose around American schools’ 
international competitiveness (Klein, 2015).   
In addition to the light shone on student test score proficiency, NCLB also implored 
states to adopt growth models based on these same student scores.  The legislation required 
that not only should student proficiency on end of year testing improve, but that subgroups of 
student scores should also improve.  NCLB placed a special emphasis on advancing 
disadvantaged students within ethnic minority groups such as those served by the free and 
reduced lunch program, and subgroups of students with English as a second language (Klein, 
2015). With the authorization of NCLB, the Federal government reinserted itself into public 
education, this time with greater influence and scope (Dee & Jacob, 2010; Klein, 2015).  
According to Dee and Jacob (2010): 
NCLB dramatically expanded the law’s [ESSA’s] scope by requiring that states 
introduce school-accountability systems that applied to all public schools and students 
in the state.  NCLB require[d] annual testing of students in reading and mathematics 
in grades 3 through 8 (and at least once in grades 10 through 12) and that states rate 
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schools, both as a whole and for key subgroups, with regard to whether they are 
making adequate yearly progress (AYP) toward their state’s proficiency goals. (para. 
2) 
The Obama administration again reauthorized ESSA guidelines in 2009.  In that year, 
the President and his administration linked a Department of Education grant program known 
as Race to the Top with an economic stimulus package, The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (Klein, 2014).  The administration used over six billion grant dollars to 
encourage states to embrace the administration’s education policies.  This included states 
allowing for the existence of charter schools, adopting a common curriculum with common 
end of year assessments, instituting college and career-ready standards, and reviewing 
teacher effectiveness using student test score analysis as one part of their evaluation (Klein, 
2014).  In order to reach the standards the DOE developed, many states began to tie the 
evaluation of teachers to the impact teachers were making on their students’ learning.  This 
impact was quantified using value-added-models or VAMs. 
Value Added Measures and EVAAS in the U.S., North Carolina 
 Proficiency, according to Bandeira de Mello et al. (2009), measures a student’s 
performance against an externally established benchmark that signifies mastery of a subject.  
In North Carolina, student test proficiency represents students scoring a level 3, 4, or 5 on an 
EOC or EOG.  These summative examinations are created by trained teacher-test-writers 
from across the state familiar with the standards the tests are to measure.  The questions are 
reviewed by other teachers and then added to a pool of questions imbedded as field test items 
on EOC or EOG tests.  Each step in the process is important for maintaining instructional 
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validity on the end of year suite of tests used in North Carolina’s public schools (Pitre-
Martin, 2018). 
A student can show grade-level proficiency but not show growth.  A model that 
would reward teachers with high levels of student proficiency is a proficiency model or 
“status model.”  Status or proficiency models report the status of a student by percentile, 
which illustrates a student’s relative strength as compared to students across the state 
(Betebenner, 2009).  Status models of performance do not take into account the growth a 
student can show on a given test even though they may not reach a level of grade-level 
proficiency. Student growth can be defined as the amount of academic progress a student 
makes in a school year (Cody, McFarland, Moore & Preston, 2010, p.2).  Putting it another 
way, value-added-models share a common characteristic; they calculate a measure of change, 
or the value added to a student’s learning over a period of time based on a student’s 
performance on a standardized test (Sorenson, 2016).  
Both achievement and growth measures are important in understanding a student’s 
academic standing and in estimating how effective a teacher is in serving the individual 
needs of her students.  Gauging teacher effectiveness based solely on achievement and 
growth measures assumes that all classroom student populations across the state, county, or 
even school are similarly constructed in terms of student demographics, general intelligence, 
and student academic readiness (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins 2012; Millman, 1997).  Using 
only student test scores to gauge teacher effectiveness overlooks student growth that may not 
yet have risen to the level of grade-level competence (Lachlan-Hache & Castro, 2015, p.3).	 
Carey (2004) summarizes the purpose for using student growth rather than proficiency as an 
indicator of school and teacher effectiveness:  
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This means that teacher effectiveness measures aren’t based on the overall 
performance of students; they’re based on the improvement of students from the 
beginning of the school year to the end. A teacher who makes better than expected 
progress with previously low achieving students would be rated more effective than a 
teacher who made only moderate progress with previously high-achieving students, 
even if the high-achieving students still finished the year with better overall scores. 
(p. 5)   
To address the high negative correlation between poverty and proficiency when assessing the 
effectiveness of schools and staffs, North Carolina found it necessary to measure student 
growth in addition to student test score proficiency (Jensen, 2009; Reardon, 2013). 
Measuring teacher impact on student learning as measured by value-added- models 
did not begin in North Carolina.  In Knoxville Tennessee, 1981, a University of Tennessee 
agricultural researcher, Dr. William Sanders, came across a newspaper article suggesting that 
there was no way for a school system to hold its teachers responsible for student test 
scores.  But after reading the article, Sanders wrote a letter to the Tennessee Governor, 
Lamar Alexander, telling him that he could develop a statistical model that could measure 
teacher effectiveness by tracking student test score data (Aldrich, 2017).  Up to this point, 
Sanders had devoted his research to agricultural output and wildlife issues.  In the search for 
a more objective measure of teacher effectiveness than principal evaluations, he applied his 
statistical model for maximizing crop yields to the issue of teacher effectiveness as measured 
by the growth in student test scores.  The Tennessee Value Added Assessment System 
(TVAAS) that Sanders developed, could assist education leaders in identifying the most 
effective and least effective teachers in what seemed a more objective way to measure 
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teacher effectiveness than achievement levels alone (Sanders, 2003).  According to Sanders 
and Horn (1998), the purpose of a VAM is to engender a climate for teacher self-reflection 
and improvement. 
If the purpose of educational evaluation is to improve the educational process, and if 
such improvement is characterized by improved academic growth of the student, then 
the inclusion of measures of the effectiveness of schools, school systems, and 
teachers in facilitating such growth is essential if the purpose is to be realized.  Of 
these three, determining the effectiveness of individual teachers holds the most 
promise because, again and again, findings from TVAAS research show teacher 
effectiveness to be the most important factor in the academic growth of students. 
(Sanders & Horn, 1998, p.3) 
By 1992, the Tennessee General Assembly adopted the Sanders Tennessee Value 
Added Assessment System (TVAAS) model as a core component of the Education 
Improvement Act (EIA) (Horn & Wilburn 2014, p. 70). The growth data this model produced, 
its creators claimed, showed how well teachers impacted their students’ learning.  The data 
was used to inform principals, teachers, and school district leaders until 2010 when TVAAS 
data began to be tied to teacher evaluations as well (Aldrich, 2017).  According to Sanders, 
his model was created with the idea that teachers were the dominant factor in determining 
student growth, minimizing the importance of class size, student heterogeneity, student 
diversity and other factors that might influence student growth (Sanders, Wright, & Horn, 
1998).   
After Tennessee’s VAM adoption, North Carolina was one of the next states to adopt 
a student growth component as part of their accountability measures.  Average statewide 
 
	 26	
growth was tabulated initially in 1993-94 in grades four through seven.  This state growth 
statistic became the comparison point by which each school’s growth was then measured 
(NCDPI, 2001).  Grade three was added in 1997 when the third grade pretest was introduced 
and a pre-test/post-test growth model could be introduced.  Grades eight and ten were finally 
added in 1997-1998.   
The Department of Public Instruction felt growth was such an important component 
for evaluating teacher effectiveness that in 1998, the General Assembly passed a law stating 
that the State Board should develop performance standards to evaluate certified employees.  
These standards included improving student achievement. (N.C. Gen. Stat. §115C 335. 
1998).  The state determined that if a school’s performance composite were less than 50 
(percentage of children scoring a three or four on the end of grade reading and math tests) 
and the school’s growth less than zero, then that the school would be designated as a “low 
performing” school (NCDPI, 2001). Trying to avoid this albatross, schools would aim to 
meet “expected” or “exemplary growth” (NCDPI, 2001).  These growth distinctions were 
determined using a formula that examined how a school progressed over a baseline 
year.  The scores of students in attendance for at least 91 days were averaged and compared 
against their aggregate average scale score from the prior year.  The growth was calculated 
and reported at the school level (NCDPI, 2001). 
Another key component in the development of the North Carolina testing program 
and growth model occurred in 2000-2001 when the State Board of Education weighted the 
ABC’s growth composites to eliminate concern over small groups of students having a 
disparate impact on school growth (NCDPI, 2001). According to the NCDPI website 
chronicling the history of North Carolina’s testing program: 
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Rather than comparing different students from one year to the next, this plan − the 
School-Based Management and Accountability Program	− holds schools accountable 
for the educational growth of the same students over time.  By focusing on growth, 
the accountability model stimulates improvement for all schools. (NCDPI,	2001). 
In 2005, North Carolina requested from the U.S. Department of Education (USED) 
the use of student growth as part of its reporting requirements for NCLB.  Later the next 
year, North Carolina was approved for USED’s Growth Model Pilot. For state accountability 
purposes, North Carolina’s public school system used a trajectory model that calculated 
growth in grades three through seven using EOG tests for math and reading with the goal of 
all students in North Carolina growing sufficiently each year so that they would achieve on-
grade-level status in both math and reading by eighth grade (WestEd, 2012).  In 2009, 
NCDPI included growth measures as part of its application for the Federal Race to the Top 
grant monies that netted the state close to $400 million to use for education initiatives across 
the state (Cody et. al, 2010).   
Most North Carolina teachers are now evaluated on the impact they make on their 
students’ learning as measured by student growth on state assessments.   The North Carolina 
public school system’s most recent iteration of a growth model is the VAM known as the 
Educator Value-Added Assessment System (EVAAS) developed to measure a teacher’s 
impact on the learning of the students she serves.  EVAAS, the North Carolina version of 
Sanders’ original TVAAS model, is now a product of the business statistics corporation 
known as SAS, based in Cary, North Carolina.  Beginning in the 2011-2012 school year, 
EVAAS was adopted by the North Carolina State Board of Education. Starting in 2012, 
teacher growth indices were to be included in the North Carolina Educator Evaluation 
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System for both teachers and school administrators.  This data became Standard VI on the 
teacher’s evaluation in 2012-2013, Standard VIII for the administrator.  A rolling EVAAS 
index average of the best two of three years for both teachers and administrators would 
determine their overall effectiveness.  
EVAAS though is just one of several value-added models used to evaluate teacher 
effectiveness across the country. Hermann, Walsh, and Isenberg, describe a value added 
model or VAM as follows: 
VAM’s predict individual student achievement based on the student’s characteristics, 
including baseline achievement, and compare this prediction with the actual 
achievement of a teacher’s students.  The prediction is derived using data on other 
students in the state or district and represents what we would expect the student to 
achieve if taught by the average teacher.  The difference between how a teacher’s 
students actually performed and how they were predicted to perform represents the 
estimate of the teacher’s value-added to student achievement. (2016, p.2) 
According to the American Educational Research Association (AERA), VAM’s can 
be divided into four categories. 
1. Growth models, also called gain score–based or mean gain models, which simply 
aggregate difference scores derived from subtracting previous scores from current 
scores on tests; 
2. Transition-based models, or categorical models, which compute aggregate 
changes in performance categories over a period of 2 or more years; 
3. Student growth percentiles–based models, which answer the question “What is 
the percentile rank of a student’s current test score compared to students with 
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similar previous test scores?” The individual teacher’s VAM score is then 
calculated as the median or mean percentiles aggregated across her or his 
students; 
4. Value-added measures–based models (VAM), which establish an expected 
current test score for students based on test scores from previous years, along with 
(possibly) other demographic characteristics of the student, classroom, and the 
school in attempting to account for the impact of factors beyond student 
achievement to isolate the teacher’s impact (AERA, 2015). 
Today, the EVAAS instrument is used not only in North Carolina but also in 
Pennsylvania, Houston, Ohio, and Tennessee to measure the impact of districts, schools, and 
teachers on the learning of their students.  By 2014, a variety of VAM models were being 
used in 44 states (Collins & Amrein-Beardsley, 2014).  According to a fact sheet from their 
own website, SAS proclaims of its VAM instrument: 
EVAAS is the most comprehensive reporting package of value-added metrics 
available in the educational market… Through the breadth of reporting and 
interactive nature of web delivery, districts and schools can set their own policy goals 
and assess their success. (SAS, 2017a, para. 2) 
 Using growth metrics to measure employee effectiveness may seem a better fit for the 
industrial or agricultural sector than it does in public education considering that the purpose 
of the Sanders’ model originally was to predict agricultural outputs (Amrein-Beardsley, 
2014).  However, some prominent politicians on both the left and right have supported the 
idea of growth data being used to evaluate teacher effectiveness.  In a 2009 speech, President 
Barack Obama made the case for linking educator effectiveness to student data. 
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Success should be judged by results, and data is [sic] a powerful tool to determine 
results.  We can’t ignore facts.  We can’t ignore data.  That’s why any state that 
makes it unlawful to link student progress to teacher evaluations will have to change 
its ways if it wants to compete for a [Race to the Top] grant. (para. 1) 
Despite Sanders’ declaration that the primary use of EVAAS data was to be for 
teacher reflection and self-improvement, VAM’s today are used for more than just teacher 
reflection in places where it has been adopted (Sanders & Horn, 1998).  State legislatures and 
educators frequently employ EVAAS and other VAM data to make termination decisions, to 
compensate teachers, and to guide principal evaluations (Goldring, Grissom, Rubin, 
Neumerski, Cannata, Drake, & Schuermann, 2015).   Even in the early years of VAMs, 
critics worried about how these growth measures would be used despite Sanders best 
intentions for the data his methodology would provide.  When an assessment system tries to 
serve two purposes, both the accountability and improvement functions, the system is less 
than optimal for accomplishing either purpose (Goldring et. al., 2015; Millman, 1997).   
Value Added Model Critiques 
 William Sanders was optimistic about his work.  He felt that he had developed a 
regression model that could be used to evaluate teacher effectiveness and at the same time 
remove the subjectivity of traditional teacher evaluation instruments like teacher observations 
and student test scores. 
An integral part of TVAAS is a massive, longitudinally merged database linking 
students and student outcomes to the schools and systems in which they are enrolled 
and to the teachers to whom they are assigned as they transition from grade to 
grade.  Research conducted utilizing data from the TVAAS database has shown that 
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race, socioeconomic level, class size, and classroom heterogeneity are poor predictors 
of student academic growth.  Rather, the effectiveness of the teacher is the major 
determinant of student academic progress...For these reasons, a component linking 
teacher effectiveness to student outcomes is a necessary part of any effective 
educational evaluation system. (Sanders & Horn, 1998, p.1) 
Despite political support for using VAMs like Sanders’ TVAAS to measure student 
academic success and in turn teacher effectiveness, several academicians and researchers 
have found evidence to provide them pause in anointing TVAAS, North Carolina’s EVAAS, 
or other VAMs as the panacea to educator evaluation problems (Amrein-Bearsley, 
Pivovarova, & Geiger, 2016; Collins, & Amrein-Beardsley, 2014).  Researched and debated 
in education circles, the validity and reliability of value-added models that supply growth 
indexes for many public school teachers across the United States are being called into 
question over their use as instruments to measure teacher success.  Not only have critics of 
VAMs expressed reservation about using student growth models for teacher evaluation, they 
have also been critical of the accuracy of these measures considering the myriad of student 
characteristics/variables that are outside the control of the classroom teacher.  As early as 
1973, Brophy argued against the use of achievement tests and student test score gains to 
assign teacher accountability.  Sources of instability must be identified and controlled when 
using student growth as a measure of teacher effectiveness (Brophy, 1973, p. 251).  One 
source of instability in VAM model measurements Harris (2010) identifies as systematic 
error.  Specifically, Harris (2010) speaks of the “summer learning loss” that may affect some 
schools and students more than others, especially in communities with fewer libraries.  More 
recently, the American Statistical Association reported that: 
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• VAMs are generally based on standardized test scores, and do not directly measure 
potential teacher contributions toward other student outcomes. 
• VAMs typically measure correlation, not causation: Effects - positive or negative - 
attributed to a teacher may actually be caused by other factors that are not captured in 
the model. 
• Under some conditions, VAM scores and rankings can change substantially when a 
different model or test is used, and a thorough analysis should be undertaken to 
evaluate the sensitivity of estimates to different models. (ASA, 2014).  
Newton (2010) and her colleagues reviewed three different VAMs in their 
longitudinal study, but even in models where demographics are controlled, there were 
negative correlations across the board with teachers of English learners, free lunch recipients, 
and Hispanic students.  Conversely, these same researchers found that there were positive 
correlations with Asian students and those students whose parents were highly educated 
(Newton, Darling-Hammond, Haertel, & Thomas, 2010).  “However, it is also possible that a 
substantial share of what some would call a ‘teacher effect’ actually measures other factors 
that are correlated with student characteristics” (Newton et. al, 2010, p. 19).  The authors 
challenge the fairness of using a VAM model that cannot take into effect student rate of 
learning influenced by prior knowledge, student attendance, time provided at home for 
homework, parent’s tutoring, and even class sizes (Newton et al., 2010).    
Notwithstanding the numerous critiques chronicled above concerning the use of 
educational VAM’s emanating from academia and educational statisticians alike, states like 
Texas, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina joined Tennessee in their search 
for a VAM tool to measure teacher effectiveness through student test data.    
 
	 33	
Teacher Incentives and Merit-Based Pay  
Teacher incentive pay is not an idea unique to North Carolina policy makers.  In the 
early 19th century, when the grade-level schooling model was developed, secondary teachers 
were paid more because it was thought that older students were more difficult to teach than 
younger ones (Guthrie, Springer, Rolle, & Houck, 2007).  By the early 20th century, 
collective bargaining and the rise of labor unions returned teaching salaries to the more 
familiar step-based compensation model (Podgursky & Springer, 2007).  In the 1920’s and 
1930’s, merit pay briefly returned to favor when scientific management theory prevailed and 
administrators adopted business model evaluations of their staffs (Johnson & Papay, 2010).  
Cold war interest in merit pay emerged again in the 50’s and 60’s and sophisticated 
observation codes were instituted only to lose favor again in the 1970’s (Johnson & Papay, 
2010).  Podursky and Springer (2007) found a brief resurgence in pay for performance 
models after a Nation at Risk was released in 1983, and today, merit pay plans are gaining 
momentum once again in part due to federal incentives to include teacher growth in state 
ESSA reauthorization plans.   
 In addition to merit pay initiatives in North Carolina since 2015, the following states 
and municipalities have instituted performance pay as well: 
• Denver Public Schools’ Professional Compensation System for Teachers (ProComp) 
• Florida’s Merit Award Program (MAP) 
• Minnesota’s Quality Compensation Program (Q-Comp),  
• Texas’ Governor’s Educator Excellence Award Programs, and 
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• National programs like the Milken Family Foundation’s Teacher Advancement 
Program (TAP) and the USDOE’s Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF). (Pham, Nguyen, & 
Springer, 2017, p. 8) 
In general, proponents of merit-based pay cite two primary reasons for their support 
of pay for performance.  First, merit pay encourages and motivates teachers to improve their 
efforts since these efforts will be rewarded (Springer & Taylor, 2016).  Consequently, 
employers do not have to designate how the outcome is to be achieved, but can allow for 
academic freedom in instructional methods, as long as student growth is occurring 
(Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991).  Secondly, financial incentives may attract and retain higher 
performing teachers to the profession (Ballou & Podgursky, 1998). 
In a cynical view of teacher merit pay, P.L. Thomas states: 
In education reform, the surveillance of students, and now the surveillance of 
teachers, is not covert, but in plain view in the form of tests and the resulting test data. 
Relying on tests and test scores for accountability allows that surveillance to be 
disembodied from those students and teachers (and thus to appear objective) and 
examined as if a reflection of merit. (Thomas, 2013 p. 89)  
Despite Thomas’s warning, North Carolina legislators have begun to favor teacher 
compensation reform plans that rely less on step plans that reward years of service and 
education attained, and more on teacher effectiveness as measured by student growth on end 
of year state-created exams (The Facts on Merit Pay for Teachers from Public Schools First 
NC, 2016; Eckert & Dabrowski, 2010).  
In 2013 the North Carolina General Assembly directed the state’s public school 
systems, local education associations (LEA’s), to develop a process for rewarding the top 
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25% of teachers in the their LEA with a bonus of $5000 to be given over four years with the 
caveat that those that receive it agree to give up tenure rights (NC Sess. Laws 360, 2013; 
Thomas, 2013).   The state did not set limits on how the LEA’s would identify this top 25%.  
However, responding to The Excellent Schools Act of 2013, the ESSA legislation established, 
• Plans to implement a system of merit pay for North Carolina teachers 
• A commitment to a “robust evaluation instrument” and further assessments of 
teachers. 
• A specific focus on student growth as a factor for teacher evaluation (Public 
Schools First NC’s “The Facts on Merit Pay for Teachers,” 2016). 
However, the state public school superintendents and the North Carolina Association of 
Educators widely rejected the merits of this bill; it was repealed before it went into effect.   
Eckert and Dabrowski in their 2010 research supported the idea of tying teacher 
compensation to student performance.  In order to move forward on this pay per performance 
model, they proposed three questions as it related to teacher effectiveness and VAMs in 
general: 
• What are the current limits of value-added measures? 
• What combination of measures could be used to determine teaching effectiveness? 
• How can we move away from divisive rhetoric toward necessary teacher 
compensation reform?  (Eckert & Dabrowski, 2010, p. 88-89) 
The proposed changes Eckert and Dabrowski documented in teacher compensation reflected 
the General Assembly’s movement toward a merit-based pay system once again.   
To understand the push for recent performance bonuses in North Carolina, one must 
understand the Read to Achieve (RTA) law (2012).  Part of the greater Excellent Public 
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Schools Act, the RTA law was designed to ensure that all students are reading at or above 
grade level by the end of third grade (Wagner, 2014).  In 2016, the NC General Assembly 
passed SL 2016-94 (Section 9.7) in an attempt to reward North Carolina’s third grade 
teachers that most impacted student learning.  The purpose of the compensation bonuses as 
described in the legislation was to study the effect of these incentives on teacher performance 
and retention (SL 2016-94).   
The free market reform efforts to transform teacher compensation models that flowed 
from session law 2016-94 continued in the fall of 2016 when the North Carolina General 
Assembly allocated $5 million for teacher bonuses for both the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 
school years.  Possibly in an attempt to attract strong teachers to third grade, these bonuses 
were allocated to the top 25% of third grade teachers in the state according to their EVAAS 
indexes.  Another reading bonus was to be given to those teachers finishing in the top 25% of 
third grade teachers in their LEA (SL 2016-94, 2013).  As a result, some third grade teachers 
in the state earned merit pay exceeding $7000 (SL 2016-94, 2013).  
 In Section 8.8 of SL 2016-94, the NC General Assembly allocated bonuses to 
additional public school teachers.  SL 2016-94 allowed for teachers of Advanced Placement 
(AP) courses to earn $50 per student that scored a 3, 4, or 5 on the associated AP 
tests.  Teachers of International Baccalaureate (IB) classes also received bonuses for fours 
and higher on IB examinations.  Finally, in Section 8.9 of the same law, high school Career 
and Technical Education Teachers (CTE) could earn $25 or $50 for children who earned 
industry certifications or credentials.  One stipulation for these high school teachers was that 
no AP, IB, or CTE teacher could receive more than $2000 in merit pay in a year. 
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The state also allocated in this same bill $17,242,627 for a “Merit Based Bonus for 
non- Educators.”  Local Education Agencies (LEAs) developed local plans on how this 
money could be used for classified staff such as custodians, clerical staff or teachers’ 
assistants.  They could also choose to develop criteria to distribute these bonus dollars for 
principals, assistant principals and central office personnel as the LEA saw fit (SL 2016-94.) 
For any of these merit-pay initiatives to meet the burden of fairness to all teachers 
eligible to receive it, the VAM instrument identifying these effective teachers must yield 
accurate and valid results.  One concern for teachers in using their VAM data to determine 
teacher effectiveness is the fact that the growth data the VAMs produce from summative 
student assessments is often not returned until the fall of the following year.  In a survey 
completed in 2014, only 10% of North Carolina teachers responded that performance-based 
pay would incentive teachers to work more effectively, and almost nine in ten felt that 
performance pay would negatively affect teacher morale and teacher retention, ruining the 
collaborative nature of teachers in public education (Oakes & Robertson, 2014).  In addition, 
there are many different subject areas, especially in North Carolina high schools, where 
growth measures are not calculated and for many subject areas and grade levels, 
compensation is not tied to their EVAAS growth (Goldring et. al., 2015.)  These courses 
include many Career Technical Education classes, foreign languages, health and physical 
education, music courses, and the other arts.  Teachers of these courses receive no EVAAS 
data.  Most importantly, even for those teachers that receive a growth measure, what 
specificity do these growth indexes provide in informing a teacher as to what they are doing 
that positively impacted student learning? (Goldring et. al., 2015, p. 96). 
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Student Growth Related to Student Characteristics and Non-Random Assignment 
Despite the many studies that critique the methodology used by VAMs, William 
Sanders’ EVAAS model receives its greatest criticisms from researchers who find that the 
lack of random student assignment nullifies any validity to the growth results his model 
calculates (Amrein-Beardsley, 2014). Sanders has made the claim that his model adequately 
accounts for all the potential influences on student growth (thereby allowing the isolation of 
teacher direct effects) on learning, by employing the experimental design principle of 
“blocking,” using each student’s prior achievement as the only control or “proxy” for all such 
influences (Kupermintz, Shepard, & Linn, 2001, p. 6). 
[E]ach child can be thought of as a ‘blocking factor’ that enables the estimation of 
school system, school, and teacher effects free of the socio-economic confoundings 
that historically have rendered unfair any attempt to compare districts and schools 
based on the inappropriate comparison of group means. (Sanders, Saxton, & Horn, 
1997, p. 138) 
According to Kupermintz et al. (2001), due to the lack of student random assignment 
to teachers in most schools, blocking out “contaminating” variability is suspect, not allowing 
for the separating out of student achievement and teacher effectiveness (p. 7-8).  Sanders 
would counter that his VAM model that compares students against their own testing history, 
nested within state results on end of year tests, makes it unnecessary to control for extraneous 
variables because the students’ characteristics are already accounted for in their previous test 
scores (Sanders et. al., 2009).  It is these “extraneous variables” that Sanders (2009) 
references that cause the most concern for researchers who reviewed EVAAS results.   
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One of the harshest critics of VAMs is Audrey Amrein-Beardsley.  In her work, she 
identifies 5 Sticky Issues that provide the basis for her VAM critiques.  She questions the 
reliability and validity of VAMs.  She finds VAM results to be biased and that the models 
lack transparency.  Finally, she finds fault with VAMs in what she found to be a lack of 
fairness (Amrein-Beardsley, Pivovarova, & Geiger, 2016, p. 37).  In so far as student 
characteristics may have an effect on teacher growth outside what Sanders’ model can 
account for, Amrein Beardsley’s sticky issues categories of bias and fairness may provide a 
framework for reviewing student characteristic effects on teacher growth results (Amrein-
Beardsley et. al., 2016). 
As Kupermintz et al. (2004) explained in their evaluation of TVAAS, the model was 
built to be used in controlled experiments that require students be randomly assigned to 
classrooms.  Paulfler and Amrein-Beardsley found in their 2014 study, however, that random 
assignment of students to classrooms is not common practice within schools.  Newton and 
her colleagues concluded in their 2010 study that if schooling systems are not set up to allow 
random assignment between students, teachers, and schools, then no statistical model, 
regardless of how sophisticated it is, can accurately measure teacher effectiveness.  Braun 
(2005) found similarly that no statistical model, however complex, and no method of analysis 
can account for causal attribution if there is no randomization in the sample. 
David Monk (1987) interviewed hundreds of principals across 17 east coast states to 
find out what they considered when they assigned students to classes.   Most reported random 
assignment within student groupings.  Principals would assign them “randomly” within 
achievement, behavioral, learning styles and student demographics groups (Dills & 
Mulholland, 2010; Monk, 1987).  Others admitted that they would allow teachers who knew 
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the kids best to make the assignments.  It is also common for principals to use ethnicity, 
gender, student behavior, language proficiency and parental requests to inform principal 
assignment practices (Burns & Mason, 1995).  Researchers have also found that principals 
will reward teachers by assigning higher achieving students, students with limited behavioral 
problems, fewer English as a Second Language (ESL) students, and students not burdened 
with poverty (Player, 2010).   
In a 2012 study of VAM models that focuses on the validity of allowing teacher 
growth to be included in their evaluations, the authors indicate several problems related to 
student characteristics and how they are tied to teacher performance in terms of growth 
(Darling-Hammond, Amrein-Beardsley, & Rothstein, 2012).  Differential summer learning 
loss particularly affects low-income children, and most end of year state tests, typically 
written on grade level, are incapable of measuring student learning below and above grade 
level with any level of accuracy (Darling-Hammond et. al, 2012; Harris, 2010).   This would 
make accurate accounting of academically gifted student growth difficult to calculate.  The 
authors continue by finding that when students aren’t randomly assigned to classrooms, no 
VAM can fully adjust for the disproportionate numbers of impoverished students or those 
with English as a second language (ESL) that may be seated in one teacher’s classroom 
(Darling-Hammond, Amrein-Beardsley, & Rothstein 2012; Collins & Amrein-Beardsley, 
2014).   
 Collins and Amrein-Beardsley found that a preponderance of ESL students, students 
with disabilities, and even academically gifted students negatively bias teacher growth 
estimates, the latter because of the ceiling effect that even Sanders and Horn (EVAAS 
creators) acknowledged in their writing (Collins & Amrein-Beardsley, 2014; Sanders, 
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Saxton, & Horn, 1997).  Other authors have found a statistically significant correlation 
between peer ability groups.  High achieving students, when grouped with other high 
achieving students, tend to grow at a higher rate compared to heterogeneous student 
groupings.  This phenomena is known in research circles as the peer effect (Burke & Sass, 
2013; Sacerdote, 2011).  Other researchers found that ALL students groups benefited when 
peer grouped with high achieving students (Hanushek, Kain, Markman, & Rivkin, 2003). 
The authors of both studies found negative peer effects when classrooms were populated 
with low achieving students.  These student groupings tended to retard the growth of low 
achieving students (Burke & Sass, 2013; Sacerdote, 2011).  Sacerdote (2011) found 
statistically significant results in classrooms where same-race peers’ starting achievement 
levels were similar. 
 “No statistical manipulation can assure fair comparisons of teachers working in very 
different schools, with very different students, under very different conditions” (Haertel, 
2013, p. 24).  Haertel seems to be speaking to every teacher in North Carolina who finds 
special challenges with the group of students they serve.  However, with this reality in mind, 
there are competing opinions about how teachers should be compensated.  According to the 
2011-2012 Schools and Staffing Survey, 95% of public school districts in American have a 
single salary schedule for compensating teachers (Pham, Nguyen, & Springer, 2017).  
However, researchers have found that there is little correlation between teachers’ years of 
service and student performance, leaving policy makers and school administrators to ponder 
whether compensating teachers based on years of service is the best use of local and state 
dollars, or whether a system of merit pay, incentive pay, performance pay, or pay for 
performance as it is sometimes called, is a better compensation model (Hanushek, 2003; 
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Podgursky & Springer, 2010; Springer, 2009).  Merit pay offers an alternative teacher 
compensation system for a tax paying public that may have concerns that teacher 
compensation based solely on degrees earned or years of service weakens teachers’ incentive 
to exert more effort into their work (Pham, Nguyen, & Springer, 2017).   
Several studies have noted that merit pay is situated within principal-agent theory 
where theoretically, workers are motivated by monetary incentives, when individual efforts 
are not easily measured (Dixit, 2002; Heinrich & Marschke, 2010; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 
1991).  Agency theory assumes that people want to avoid risk or hard work and a supervisor 
must account for this by creating a compensation system that compels the worker to work 
while minimizing risk (Jensen, 1983).  This theory is inadequate for studying merit pay in the 
current public education system because numerous studies have found teachers to be 
motivated by reasons other than personal economics (Besley & Ghatak, 2005; Cohen & 
Murnane, 1985; Horne, Foley & Flora, 2014; Kellough & Lu, 1993; Marsden & Richardson, 
1994). The overarching assumption in agency theory is that agents, or teachers, need an 
economic reason to show up to work every day when researchers have found that teachers 
are also motivated by non-economic variables and intrinsically motivated as well (Horne et 
al, 2014).  
Conceptual Framework 
 Critiques of VAM models and their use in high stakes decisions involving teacher 
dismissal and merit pay are not hard to find with the simplest of Google searches.  Two 
studies, however, serve as a jumping off point for my research.  Baker et al. (2010) outline 
the weaknesses of all VAMs including North Carolina’s EVAAS metric.  The authors 
summarize their findings this way: 
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While those who evaluate teachers could take student test scores over time into 
account, they should be fully aware of their limitations, and such scores should be 
only one element among many considered in teacher profiles.  Some states are now 
considering plans that would give as much as 50% of the weight in teacher evaluation 
and compensation decisions to scores on existing poor-quality tests of basic skills in 
math and reading…but the serious problems of attribution and nonrandom assignment 
of students, as well as the practical problems described above, would still argue for 
serious limits on the use of test scores for teacher evaluation (p. 20).  
The researchers’ focus on non-random student assignment to classrooms and their concern 
over teacher compensation tied to VAM scores will help shape my research. 
The second study that will inform my methodology will be the Burke and Sass study 
from 2013 in which the authors reviewed student peer effects using linear and non-linear 
models to gage their influence on individual student achievement gains.  Using the student 
demographic and socio-economic status variables described in Chapter One, I will design a 
model that discovers if teachers with different student clusters are truly receiving appropriate 
consideration when it comes to their opportunity to receive a merit-based bonus. 
Synthesis of Literature 
The stakes are high for North Carolina’s elementary and middle school teachers with 
the onset of merit pay.  With the opportunity in grades three through eight to earn up to 
$7000 in additional salary, teacher EVAAS growth measures are more important today than 
ever for teachers, if not for students.  Even though the educator growth indexes are no longer 
tied directly to teacher evaluations, the North Carolina legislature is now compensating 
teachers who are able to grow their students most effectively, independent of the students’ 
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reaching grade level proficiency as measured by EOG math and reading assessments.  The 
researchers who have tackled the VAM issues tied to teacher evaluation, teacher 
compensation, and teacher dismissal are predominantly critical of the high stakes use of 
EVAAS and other VAMs.  The models’ inability to control for non-random student 
assignment and peer effects on student performance remain unaccounted for in the model 
despite the “blocking” effects claimed by EVAAS model proponents that mitigate any of the 
concerns the critics cite.  Due to the conflicting ideas on the VAM models’ measurement 
validity, a quantitative analysis of teacher merit-based compensation in grades three through 
eight in relation to their EVAAS indices will be a study worth doing. 
Summary 
 In Chapter Three, I will describe an exploratory model that utilizes a quantitative 
methodology to look at teacher impact on student learning (growth) in a rural western North 
Carolina County that have had students non-randomly assigned to their classrooms.  In this 
study, I will gather the bonus data on those teachers in 2017-2018 who received the merit pay 
in 20 elementary and middle schools that serve students in grades three through eight.  The 
sample size of students in math and reading will be over 5000 children who tested in both 
math and reading during the 2017-2018 academic year.  I will review growth indexes for 
approximately 220 teachers that serve these students.  Finally, I will develop a logistic 
stepwise regression model that will reveal if students characteristics prevalent in a teacher’s 
classroom are having any influence on which teachers are receiving merit-based bonuses for 
most effectively impacting their students growth as measured by the EVAAS growth 
instrument.  If the EVAAS instrument is sufficiently robust without the use of student 
characteristic variables to identify effective teachers, I would expect no student 
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characteristics to appear as significant and impactful in predicting which teachers will receive 
merit-based bonuses.   
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Chapter 3: Research Method and Design 
Introduction 
There are teachers who work with the impoverished, schools serving mostly second 
language learners, school systems where minority populations prevail: Do these teachers and 
schools share the same opportunity to achieve expected growth or to exceed growth as 
schools that serve more advantaged populations?  Alternatively, is it possible or even likely, 
that the teachers of students in poverty have a greater chance to achieve high growth indexes 
due to their students having more room to grow?  With this growth conundrum as a primary 
driver of my research, I will develop in this chapter a methodology that will best answer the 
research question − is the likelihood of a North Carolina teacher receiving incentive pay 
impacted by the student characteristics prevalent in her classroom?   
Research Design and Paradigm 
Creswell defines and explains the nuances of three different research designs in his 
writings.  These research methods consist of qualitative, quantitative, and mixed (Creswell, 
2005).  In writing The Practice of Social Research, Babbie (2010) describes research using a 
quantitative methodology this way:  
Quantitative methods emphasize objective measurements and the statistical, 
mathematical, or numerical analysis of data collected through polls, questionnaires, 
and surveys, or by manipulating pre-existing statistical data using computational 
techniques.  Quantitative research focuses on gathering numerical data and 
generalizing it across groups of people or to explain a particular phenomenon. (p. 84) 
Following Babbie and Creswell’s quantitative research guidelines, the plan for my research is 
to gather pre-existing data on student characteristics, exclusively categorical in nature, to 
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help explain why certain teacher receive the bonuses for reading and math instruction in 
grades three through eight as described in the research question.  The goal is for this study to 
be effectively valid and sufficiently reliable because the method design is repeatable and the 
findings are generalizable in part or in whole to other districts across the state of North 
Carolina (Babbie, 2010; Creswell, 2005).  
Embedded within the concept of a quantitative research framework is what Creswell 
refers to as a worldview and what other theorists have called research paradigms (Creswell, 
2005; Guba & Lincoln, 2008).  The general philosophical orientation, paradigm, or 
worldview that I bring to this research is one of post-positivism.  This paradigm is an 
offshoot from the positivist philosophical framework derived from the scientific method 
more prominent among researchers in the early to mid-1900’s (Creswell, 2005).  Positivism 
is the idea that there is a truth that can be found by quantifying human behavior through data 
and research (Phillips & Burbules, 2000).   The post positivists, however, are not as dogmatic 
in demanding their data and subsequent research findings reveal an absolute truth.  
Nonetheless, the post positivists do seek to identify the causes that influence outcomes 
(Creswell, 2005; Phillips & Burbules, 2000).  A post positivist would posit that although our 
knowledge is fallible we should not quit seeking the truth (Phillips & Burbules, 2000).  
Creswell (2005) posits that post positivism is reductionist.  The intent of post positivist 
research then is to reduce ideas into a small, discrete data set to test, such as the variables that 
comprise hypotheses and research questions (Creswell, 2005).  Finally, post positivism is 
deterministic in philosophy in that it assumes there are causes that determine outcomes 
(Creswell, 2005).   
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When choosing a quantitative research design, a researcher must select one that takes 
into consideration the population from which the data is drawn and the type of data that can 
be obtained before selecting a model that best explains a phenomena being examined 
(Creswell, 2005).  As previously stated, the research methodology for this study will be 
quantitative.  According to Creswell, a quantitative approach is one in which: 
…[T]he investigator primarily uses postpositivist claims for developing knowledge 
(i.e., cause and effect thinking, reduction to specific variables and hypotheses and 
questions, use of measurement and observation, and the test of theories), employs 
strategies of inquiry such as experiments and surveys, and collects data on 
predetermined instruments that yield statistical data. (2005, p.8) 
Rather than surveys or experimental data, this quantitative study will use data that represents 
student characteristics in grade three through eight classrooms and the corresponding growth 
data of the teachers that served these students.  The research will be descriptive rather than 
experimental as this data already exists and no treatments will be applied to the subjects of 
the study as in experimental research (Creswell, 2005).  This research will also be 
exploratory.  I will identify student characteristics that have the greatest impact on teachers’ 
likelihood of receiving a merit-based bonus, or I may find that no variables influence a 
teacher’s likelihood to receive the merit bonus.  Through the post positivist lens however, I 
will conduct my research not to assume causality between the independent and dependent 
variables, but rather to find associations and relationships among the predictor and outcome 
variables.  I will look for correlations between the dependent variables, teachers receiving the 
bonus or not for math and reading instruction, and the 13 independent variables that describe 
the student characteristics used in this study (Table 3.1). 
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When taking on a quantitative research study with thousands of pieces of data, the 
researcher must follow certain guidelines as outlined by Babbie (2010).  My research 
methods will be documented alongside Babbie’s guidelines for quantitative research. 
• The data is usually gathered using structured research instruments.  This research 
will guide the collection of existing student demographic and SES data from the 
North Carolina Secure Shell server via the PowerSchool student information system 
portal. 
• The results are based on larger sample sizes that are representative of the population.  
This research will consider the characteristics of all students in grades three through 
eight in the selected county of study.  However, this is not necessarily a representative 
sample of all similar-aged peers from across the state of North Carolina. 
• The research study can usually be replicated or repeated, given its high reliability.  
This idea of repeatability will be discussed in the validity and reliability section of 
this chapter. 
• The researcher has a clearly defined research question to which objective answers 
are sought.  Is the likelihood of a North Carolina teacher receiving incentive pay 
impacted by the student characteristics prevalent in his/her classroom? 
• All aspects of the study are carefully designed before data is collected.  The design of 
this research is to use a logistic regression forward step-wise approach for the binary 
independent and dependent variables in the study. 
• Data are in the form of numbers and statistics, often arranged in tables, charts, 
figures, or other non-textual forms.  The data is categorical in nature, so it is not 
continuous like data that is analyzed through multiple and simple linear regression.  
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The SPSS tool will run the logistic regression and the findings will be reported with 
data tables. 
• The project can be used to generalize concepts more widely, predict future results, or 
investigate causal relationships.  This research will hopefully spur others in the field 
to replicate its processes to see if different regions of the state reveal similar findings.  
This might also be replicated in other states where merit-based bonuses are being 
utilized and incentive pay considered (Johnson & Papay, 2010, Player, 2010; Springer 
& Taylor, 2016; Thomas, 2013). 
• The researcher uses tools, such as questionnaires or computer software, to collect 
numerical data. The data collected here will have been gathered from the North 
Carolina Department of Testing and Accountability’s Secure Shell that links to the 
PowerSchool student database and information system (Babbie, 2010). 
Logistic Regression 
  This study will employ a logistic regression model that will use nominal categorical 
binary variables that will be identified later.  Categorical data can be nominal or ordinal.  
Ordinal data can be compared and ranked as in 1st, 2nd, and 3rd.  Nominal data is only 
differentiated by its name, like a group’s ethnicity or a person’s enrollment in a program 
(McColl, 2019).  
In general, logistic regression seeks to: 
• Model the probability of an event occurring depending on the values of the 
independent variables, which can be categorical or numerical 
• Estimate the probability that an event occurs for a randomly selected observation 
versus the probability that the event does not occur 
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• Predict the effect of a series of variables on a binary response variable 
• Classify observations by estimating the probability that an observation is in a 
particular category (such as approved or not approved). (Foltz, 2015) 
I will have to reject other types of linear and non-linear regression models because the data I 
will be using is categorical and binary in nature.  Therefore, the data will not have a normal 
distribution needed for most typical linear regressions (Foltz, 2015). 
In the vein of post positivist thinking where no absolute truth can ever be found, I will 
develop a hypothesis and a null hypothesis, and then rather than fully except the hypothesis 
on its validity, I will seek to reject the null (Phillips & Burbules, 2000).  The null hypothesis 
for this study is that there is no impactful and statistically significant student characteristic 
variable, to a .05 significance level, that accounts for a teacher having a better chance than 
another teacher to earn a merit-based bonus in math or reading based on the composition of 
students in her classroom. 
Design Rationale 
Creswell (2005) tells us that if a researcher finds a problem that leads him to identify 
factors that influence an outcome, then a quantitative approach is best (p.22).  This particular 
research will look at the state’s merit-based pay program for teachers of students in grade 
three through eight in the subjects of reading and math.  The program was designed to 
encourage and reward teaching excellence and to encourage better personnel to enter into the 
teaching profession (The Facts on Merit Pay for Teachers, 2016). 
Continuous data like test scores, IQ, height, weight, age, etc. may be better suited to a 
linear or multiple regression model.  The data used for this study, however, will be 
categorical or binary in nature.  The data will not be continuous.  It will be nominal rather 
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than ordinal since there will be no degrees in the data like a researcher may find with survey 
responses using Likert scales (Creswell, 2005, McColl, 2019).  For example, one binary 
categorical variable used in this study is a child’s involvement in the Exceptional Children’s 
program. Either the child is served by the Exceptional Children’s program or he is not.  
Another example is the English Language Learner variable.  Either a child is served by the 
ELL program or she is not.  There are no degrees to ethnicity although there are six 
categories of race that will all be coded with a zero or one.  In this research, even poverty is a 
binary predictor variable as the child is either receiving free or reduced lunch or he isn’t.  
Because the student characteristics will be either yes or no in relation to the variables, the 
study will incorporate nominal categorical predictive (independent) variables (McColl, 
2019).   The dependent variable, teachers receiving the bonus, will be binary as well.  The 
teacher must be in the top 25% of teachers across the state in their given subject and grade to 
receive the bonus based on their EVAAS growth data.    
In a forward stepwise approach, I will seek to accept or abandon some of the 
categorical variables as valid predictors of the dependent variable.  Following the step-
wise approach of adding and removing variables, I will find a model of best fit that 
illustrates which student characteristics, if any, are significant predictors of teachers 
receiving the merit-based bonus.  Because of a binary dependent variable, plotting the 
predictor variables versus the response variable does not yield linear scatter plots.  
Logistic models do not use simple linear regressions as a result, but in order to develop 
predictive models, the data must be adjusted so as to mimic a linear regression.  In order 
to regress y onto 𝑥!, one must convert the dependent binary variable into a logit that 
looks like this:  𝐿𝑛 !
!!!
= 𝛽! +  𝛽!𝑋! +  𝛽!𝑋!…+ 𝛽!𝑋! where the logit function is the natural log 
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of the odds that Y equals one of the categories (in this case, the probability is .25 that a 
teacher will receive the bonus), and P is defined as the probability that Y=1 (Logistic 
regression with Stata Chapter 1, 2019).  The X’s are the independent predictor variables (the 
student characteristics in this model), and the 𝛽 is the beta coefficient of the independent 
variables.   In logistic regression, the β indicates the amount of change expected in the log 
odds when there is a one-unit change in the predictor variable with all of the other variables 
in the model held constant (Logistic regression with Stata Chapter 1, 2019).   
One of the concerns I have in my data sets is the multi-collinearity of independent 
variables.  I foresee correlations between several of the variables and the Socio-Economic 
Status (SES) variable, represented in this study by students served by the free and reduced 
lunch program.  The choice of a logistic regression model and a stepwise process help to 
mitigate this concern of multi-colinnearity as logistic models are designed to compensate for 
this statistical phenomona.  Questions about the collinearity of variables will be discussed in 
Chapter Five under recommendations for future research. 
Role of the Researcher 
To protect student anonymity, I will interact with the data only after it has been 
masked.  I will request through appropriate school district protocol that the rural school 
district’s employee with access to the state’s Secure Shell (where student testing data is 
stored) retrieve the data that will contain student test scores and student characteristics.  The 
same employee will extract the teacher growth data that can be found in the EVAAS portal, 
match it against payroll information designating which teachers received the EVAAS-
dependent merit-based bonus, and merge the two data files to connect teacher merit-pay data 
with student data.  From the combined data set provided by the district, I will use forward 
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step wise logistic regression in order to find any student characteristic variable(s) that shows 
a strong correlation to teachers that exceeded expected growth and thereby earned the math 
or reading bonus allocated to the top 25% of teachers in those grades and subjects in North 
Carolina’s public schools.   
Ethical Issues 
The ethical issues in my research will revolve around the gathering of data and the 
anonymity provided using student demographic and student characteristic data.  I will also 
look at data representing teachers who have received merit-based bonuses.  I do not supervise 
any of the teachers whose data is being considered for this study.  The school district will 
gather all of the data that I will analyze before I put my hands on it.  The student names and 
identification numbers and teacher names will be removed so that I will be unaware of any of 
the individuals represented in the data set.  Biasing the data should be minimal since I will 
not be interacting within the data collection environment as one might if observing a 
classroom or interviewing a subject (Creswell, 2005, p. 171).  The student and teacher 
information will be collected from existing databases and will not be altered. 
Data Sources 
The data will come from several state testing databases.  The North Carolina 
Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI) uses a Secure Shell to transfer and store all test 
scores and student demographic data.  Secure Shell receives its student demographic and 
characteristic data from the student information system in North Carolina known as 
PowerSchool, from software associated with the Exceptional Children’s program, and from 
data entered by teachers into the NCTest Admin portal used to provide accommodations to 
students for online testing.   
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Data Collection  
The data will be downloaded from the state server or Secure Shell described 
previously.  NCDPI pulls this data from PowerSchool, the student data information system 
that houses attendance, grades, parent access portals, student demographic information, and 
all other relevant educational information for North Carolina public school students.  The 
state compiles this student information into a file on Secure Shell called PCAUDIT.  This is 
short for “Proficiency Audit” and it catalogs all EOG and EOC student scores as they 
progress from third through twelfth grade and beyond.  In addition to student scores, the file 
attaches student demographic data to their test scores in grades three through eleven. 
Participants 
The goal of quantitative research studies is to be able to make generalizations about 
larger groups based on the findings of a smaller population of study participants (Blackstone, 
2012; Creswell, 2005).  Different techniques for sampling the larger population are 
conducted in quantitative research.  Probability sampling and representative sampling aim to 
gather participant samples that are representative of the larger group.  Random selection 
techniques are also utilized to be sure that the group to be studied possesses proportional 
samplings of the larger group’s characteristics so that valid and reliable generalizations might 
be drawn from study findings (Blackstone, 2012).   
In this study however, I am fortunate to have access to almost 100% of the population 
of students in a rural western North Carolina county in grades three through eight that 
completed the math and reading EOG’s in the 2017-2018 school year.  In Chapter Five I will 
discuss limits to generalizability that manifest not because the participants are not correctly 
represented in the data, but because the populations of students in other LEA’s carry with 
 
	 56	
them student characteristics represented in different proportions.  All students testing in 
reading in grades three through five and all students testing in math in grades four through 
eight will be part of the study. This includes approximately 5000 students and about 8000 test 
scores from the North Carolina End of Grade assessments in the corresponding grades and 
subject areas. Students will be characterized with the following demographics and personal 
characteristic variables (Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1  
Study Participants 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant Group Categories Description 
  
Ethnicity Asian, African Americans, Hispanic, Mixed Race, Pacific Islander, 
White 
  
Socio-economic level The data available for this characteristic is dependent on the child’s 
participation in the free and reduced lunch program.   
  
Sex  Male or Female 
  
English as a second language program 
participant 
Student participation in the English as a Second Language or EL 
program 
  
Academically and intellectually gifted Students identified for and participating in the AIG program. 
  
Exceptional children’s program 
participants 
Students served by the special education program.  Those served in 
this instance are not those students being instructed on the Extended 
Content Standards (Extend 1 students), but those that participate in 
the regular curriculum and are on track to receive a regular high 
school diploma.  These students may be served in speech, 
occupational or physical therapy, for having a reading disability, a 
math or writing disability, or being “other-health-impaired.”  The 
“other health-impaired” special education label includes students with 
“attention deficit hyperactivity” disorder, and other health concerns 
that may affect their ability to access the curriculum. 
  
Teachers receiving the bonus  In North Carolina, the top 25% of teachers in grades four through 
eight received a bonus in the 2017-2018 academic year as a result of 
their students growing academically in math.  In grades three through 
five, the top 25% of teachers impacting student learning as measured 
by EVAAS also earned a bonus. 
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Participant Selection 
 
In order to access a robust data base, the study will examine student testing results 
from the 2017-2018 school year in EOG reading and math scores for students in grades three 
through eight.  Any summer school testing (second test administrations) will not be 
considered for this study.  Only student first-test-administration results from May and June of 
2018 will be considered for this research since it is only the first test results that are used to 
tabulate teacher growth data.  All students testing in this rural western North Carolina county 
will be included in the study.  I will use data from 21 schools across six grade levels in two 
subject areas to expand my data set to over 5000 students and their subsequent 
characteristics. 
Institutional Review Board Procedures 
 Institutional Review Boards (IRB) are situated in research institutions to satisfy 
Federal requirements for ethical research but also, as summed up the Plymouth State 
University IRB web site: 
o To promote the safety and well-being of human participants 
o To ensure adherence to the ethical values and principals underlying research 
o To ensure that only ethical and scientifically valid research is implemented 
o To allay concerns by the general public about the responsible conduct of 
research. (2019) 
The Appalachian State University Internal Review Board serves a valuable 
institutional and fundamental research function.  The IRB serves to protect human subjects 
and manage their risk during their involvement in research conducted in conjunction with the 
university.  As part of the review process, I had to complete online training modules to be 
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granted permission by the University and the IRB to conduct my study.  A central theme to 
the tutorials was that the researcher must at all times maintain student confidentiality. These 
courses would set the framework for how I could gather data, conduct the research, and 
report the findings.  Since I would be working with existing data and would not be 
interacting with subjects, the primary concern of the IRB was that I would maintain student 
anonymity within my data collection and publication.  In fact, to maintain a level of 
separation from the data collection process, a representative of the LEA collected the data, 
and then removed any identifying student markings such as student names and identifying 
numbers before I could receive it.  The “Agreement to Use Student Data” letter (Appendix I) 
was submitted to the Appalachian State University IRB board by my dissertation chair to 
summarize my research and any risk to subjects involved therein. 
 The superintendent’s permission to conduct this study was also gained although the 
letter of permission will not be printed here to maintain the anonymity of the LEA where the 
data was gathered.  My dissertation chair and the Appalachian State IRB reviewed and 
approved my research proposal within the parameters of access granted by the superintendent 
on behalf of the school board.  Results of the study will be shared with this same 
superintendent and school board upon completion although again, individual student data 
will be destroyed upon study completion. 
Data Coding 
 In alignment with the logistic regression procedures described above, the dependent 
variable, teachers having received the merit-based bonus or not, will be binary.  Each of the 
independent variables will be binary as well.  Those teachers having received the bonus will 
be coded with a “1” for the students that they served.  Those who did not will be a “0”.  
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Table 3.2 outlines the dependent and independent variables, the type of variable each is, the 
variable symbol, and the way that the variable will be coded. 
Table 3.2 
Dependent and Independent Variable Data Coding 
 
Variable Variable Type Variable Symbol Coding 
Teachers receiving the 
reading bonus (Gr. 3-5) 
Dependent RDGB_1 1 for teacher receiving bonus, 
0 for not receiving 
 
* Teachers not receiving the 
reading bonus (Gr. 3-5) 
Dependent RDGB_0 1 for teachers not receiving 
the bonus, 0 for receiving 
 
Teachers receiving the math 
bonus (Gr. 4-8) 
Dependent MTHB_1 1 for teacher receiving bonus, 
0 for not receiving 
 
* Teachers not receiving the 
math bonus (Gr. 4-8) 
Dependent MTHB_0 1 for teachers not receiving 
the bonus, 0 for receiving 
 
Ethnicity Independent Asian 1 if a student is Asian, 
0 if they are not 
 Independent Black 1 if a student is African 
American, 0 if they are not 
 Independent Hispanic 1 if a student is Hispanic, 0 if 
they is not 
 Independent Indian 1 if student is Native 
American, 0 if they is not 
 Independent Mixed 1 if a student is mixed race, 0 
if they is not 
 Independent PacificIs 1 if a student is pacific 
islander, 0 if they are not 
 Independent White 1 if a student is white, 0 if 
they are not 
Sex Independent Male 1 if a student is male, 0 if 
they are not 
 Independent Female 1 if a student is female, 0 if 
they are not 
 
Academically and 
Intellectually Gifted 
Independent AIG 1 if a student is in the AIG 
program, 0 if they are not 
 
** Students with Disabilities Independent SWD 1 if they are served by the 
SWD program, 0 if they are 
not.  
***Socio-Economic Status Independent SES 1 if a student receives free or 
reduced lunch, 0 if they do 
not 
English Language Learner 
program (new comers and 
long term EL’s) 
Independent ELL 1 if a student is served by the 
ELL program, 0 if they do 
not 
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* The reason for this reverse coding is due to the negative coefficient statistic found when running the logistic 
regression. See findings in Chapter 4. 
** For this study, students that are served by the AIG program will NOT be included in the SWD category as 
they are in some state level reporting that combines both into an Exceptional Children’s category. 
*** The SES variable is a proxy for poverty in this study 
 
Student Population Groups 
 Conducting research that yields valid and reliable results requires sufficient sampling 
of the overall population to be studied.  Research populations consist of a group of 
individuals comprised of the same characteristics (Creswell, 2005, p. 595).  In this case, 
students in grades three through eight that took the math and reading EOG’s in the 2017-
2018 school year makeup the research population.  Problems can arise in interpreting 
findings from the research and in generalizing those findings to the larger group if the 
researcher is unable to draw a representative sample from the entire population (Creswell, 
2005, p. 597).  In this study, I will use close to 100% of the students in the population as my 
sample.  I will be looking at the characteristics of the students that tested in grades three 
through eight in the identified school system during the 2017-2018 school year.  Only a small 
number of students (less than 10 in both the math and reading populations) were discarded 
due to their not having an assigned reading or math teacher when data was compiled for this 
study.  The frequency table below (Table 3.3) illustrates the number of students that fall into 
each category (predictor variables) and the percentage of the student population they account 
for in this exploratory logistic regression study. 
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Table 3.3 
Frequency Table for Math and Reading Bonus, Student Population 
Student Characteristics Math Students 
Grades 4-8 
% of Math 
Students 
Reading Students 
Grades 3-5 
% of Reading 
Students 
Total 4490  2925  
Asian 277  6.2% 178  6.1% 
African-American 205  4.6% 131  4.5% 
Hispanic 779  17.3% 515  17.6% 
Native American 3  0.07% 2  0.07% 
Mixed Race 286  6.4% 189  6.5% 
Pacific Islander 7  0.14% 2  0.07% 
White 2933  65.3% 1908  65.2% 
        
Male 2318 51.6% 1551 53.0% 
Female 2172 48.4% 1374 47.0% 
     
Academically and 
Intellectually Gifted 
(math and/or reading) 
864 19.2% 469 16.0% 
     
Students with 
Disabilities 
728 16.2% 526 18.0% 
     
Served by Free and 
Reduced Lunch 
Program 
2748 61.2% 1884 64.4% 
     
English Language 
Learner 
311 6.9% 308 10.5% 
 
Data Analysis 
A forward stepwise logistic regression model was employed to find a model of best 
fit in determining whether to accept the hypothesis or not.  The Null hypothesis (H0) for this 
study is that there is no impactful and statistically significant student characteristic variable, 
to a .05 significance level, that accounts for a teacher having a better chance than another 
teacher to earn a merit-based bonus in math or reading based on the composition of students 
in her classroom.  To understand the soundness of the logistical regression model and its 
statistical findings, Peng, Lee and Ingersoll (2002) recommend analyzing the following: 
a) The overall model evaluation 
b) The statistical tests of individual predictors 
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c) A goodness-of-fit statistics and 
d) The validations of predicted probabilities  (p. 5) 
For overall model evaluation, three inferential statistical tests: the likelihood ratio, score, and 
Wald tests will serve as indicators as to whether the model is an improvement over the null 
hypothesis (Peng et al. 2002). 
The SPSS program will produce several statistics to help me evaluate the viability of 
the null hypothesis. To test the significance of the individual predictors (testing their 
regression coefficients, 𝐵), using the Wald 𝒳! statistic will indicate whether they are 
significant at the p < .05 level. We will look at the degrees of freedom statistic (df) and the 
odds ratio that SPSS reports as Exp(B) (Field, n.d.). This log ratio will provide information to 
the researcher about what correlations exists between students with certain characteristics, 
and the likelihood of teachers receiving the bonus in math or reading that work with these 
student characteristic groups.  Said another way, since logistic measures are the natural log of 
odds ratios, they can be transformed back into probabilities to examine if high probabilities 
are associated with events and low probabilities with non-events (Peng et al. 2002). 
When SPSS generates its tables, it will be important to read the sign of the coefficient 
(B).  If the coefficient is negative, it is indicating that there may be an inverse relationship 
between the predictor variables and the dependents.  In the case of the independent variables 
having a negative B coefficient, I will recode the dependent variable with a “1” for not 
receiving the bonus and a “0” for a teacher receiving the bonus.  This should flip the sign of 
the dependent variable and change the Exp(B) statistic to something that is positive and from 
which information can be extrapolated.  This new log ratio may indicate that certain student 
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characteristics have the effect of decreasing the likelihood of a teacher receiving the math or 
reading bonus.  
Trustworthiness 
 Being objective is an essential aspect of competent inquiry, and for this reason 
researchers must examine methods and conclusions for bias. For example, standards of 
validity and reliability are important in quantitative research (Creswell, 2005). 
I will not be utilizing a previous researcher’s instrument to gather data like I might if I were 
doing surveys or interviews.  I will be creating a logistic regression best-fit model to analyze 
student characteristics that might influence a teacher’s receiving the merit-based bonus.  The 
reliability of my study will rest on its ability to be repeatable, and the findings generalizable.  
Limited research exists in North Carolina on subject-specific merit-bonuses tied to individual 
teacher growth in large part because the teacher bonus model has only been in place since the 
2016-2017 school year.  As a result, there may be some interest in repeating this research in 
other regions of the state where student demographics differ.  A researcher may want to 
conduct a study to discover if the state model is the fairest way to identify teachers that 
should receive the performance bonuses.  Other researchers may critique my findings and 
find that my model left out one or more important characteristics to which I may or may not 
have had access.  In short, the trustworthiness of my study will hinge on its repeatability and 
the generalizability of its results. 
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Chapter 4: Results of the Research 
Introduction  
 The North Carolina General Assembly has been adjusting the teacher salary schedule 
since the passing of the Excellent Public Schools Act of 2013.  The state legislature has 
ratified statutes that have significantly altered the step approach to teacher pay, a system 
commonly used among school systems nationally that appropriates teachers yearly step raises 
for each year employed or for degrees earned, regardless of the teachers’ effectiveness.  The 
North Carolina teacher salary schedule implemented in July of 2018 has provided larger 
percentage raises for teachers in their first five years compared to teachers in years 15-24 
who see no graduated pay, significantly altering the year by year raises evident in most 
public school teacher pay scales (Appendix D - North Carolina Public School Salary 
Schedules, 2018).   
In an attempt to link teacher pay to teacher effectiveness, legislators hoped to 
incentivize teaching excellence by providing merit-based bonuses that would reward 
excellent teaching, subsidizing those teachers that were the most effective at impacting their 
students’ learning (Helms, 2017).  The 2018 salary scale (Appendix D) is a modified version 
of graduated teacher pay, but to improve their take home wages, teachers in grades three 
through eight can best supplement their incomes by being in the top 25% of teachers locally 
and in the state as measured by their EVAAS reading and math growth indices.  Through an 
exploratory quantitative methodology, I will examine through logistical regression whether 
the characteristics of students in grades three through eight in a rural western North Carolina 
school district positively or negatively affect a teacher’s likelihood of receiving the state 
bonus for teachers of reading and math in these specific grades. 
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Results  
In order to conduct the research, the SPSS regression tool was used to regress the 
different student characteristics represented by the predictor variables, onto the dependent 
variables, the teachers either receiving the bonus for reading and math growth or not 
receiving the bonus.  For the study I used a logistic regression model.  Logistic regression is 
the preferred regression model for handling binary dependent variables (Peng, Lee, & 
Ingersoll, 2002; Wuensch, 2014).  For the sake of consistency, both the dependent variables 
and the independent variables were constructed as binary categorical variables.  As an 
example, a student who receives free and reduced lunch was coded as a “1,” a student who 
pays for their lunch with a “0.”  A student who is served by the English Second Language 
program as a “1,” a student who is not as a “0.”  This binary coding is true of each of the 
student characteristic and demographic data as defined in Chapter Three.   
 A forward stepwise methodology was utilized for this logistic regression.  When 
selecting variables for any regression work, the goal of variable selection is parsimony 
(NCSS Statistical Software, p. 311-1).  The goal according to NCSS is to “achieve a balance 
between simplicity (as few regressors as possible) and fit (as many regressors as needed)” (p. 
311-1).  With simplicity and fit as its aim, the forward stepwise approach starts with no 
predictor variables in the model and then adds variables as long as their p-value is less than 
the predetermined alpha (a), in this example, .05.  In other words, those variables selected 
have less than a 5% chance of being related to the dependent variable merely because of 
chance (Creswell, 2005, p. 598).  In determining a logistic regression model of best fit, I will 
be attempting to reject the null hypothesis outlined in Chapter Two.  The null hypothesis 
(𝐻!) for this study is that there is no impactful and statistically significant student 
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characteristic variable, to a .05 significance level, that accounts for a teacher having a better 
chance than another teacher to earn a merit-based bonus in math or reading based on the 
composition of students in her classroom. 
With a forward stepwise approach, the SPSS program continues to add variables as 
long as the variable has a p-value < .05, starting with the variable that has the greatest R-
squared value and working its way through the predictor variables based on these two 
parameters (NCSS, p. 311.1).  
 The first logistic regression reflects the following conditions (Table 4.1.a-d): 
1. The dependent variable, RDGB_1 (Reading teachers having received the bonus or 
not), is coded as a “1” for a teacher receiving the bonus, “0” for a teacher that did 
not.  Only 25% of reading teachers in the state received the merit-based bonus for 
having the top EVAAS scores in grades three through five. 
2. Student data in grades six through eight was eliminated from this study since 
teachers serving kids in these grades were not eligible to receive the reading 
bonus by state statute.  Only students in grades three through five with an 
assigned reading teacher were used for this reason. 
3. Students taught on the “Extended Content” standards (took the Extend 1 end of 
year state assessment) were also excluded since these end-of-year assessments do 
not generate a growth statistic for the teacher. These students with special 
learning needs account for 1% of the student population and have special learning 
needs. 
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One can see from the “Variables in the Equation” (Table 4.1.a) that the forward 
stepwise regression was run four times.  The “Variables in the Equation” illustrates which 
variable are significant at a p-value < .05 (Appendix E).    
Table 4.1.a-d 
SPSS Binary Logistic Regression Results – Grades 3-5 Reading: Dependent Variable Coded 
as 1: (RDGB _1) 
 
Table 4.1.a 
Block 1: Method = Forward Stepwise (Conditional) 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 
  Chi-Square df Sig. 
Step 4 Step 4.215 1 .040 
 Block 70.228 4 .000 
 Model 70.228 4 .000 
 
 
Table 4.1.b 
Classification Table 
 
  
Observed 
RDGB_1 
.00 
Predicted 
1.00 
Percentage 
Correct  
Step 4 RDGB_1      .00 756 822 47.9  
 RDGB_0    1.00 462 885 65.7  
 Overall Percentage   56.1  
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Table 4.1.c 
Variables in the Equation 
 
 Ind. Var. B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 4 Asian .723 .172 17.751 1 .000 2.062 
 Mixed .351 .170 4.265 1 .039 1.420 
 White .714 .095 56.327 1 .000 2.042 
 SWD -.301 .099 9.245 1 .002 .740 
 Constant -.643 .085 57.765 1 .000 .526 
a. Based on conditional parameter estimates 
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Table 4.1.d 
Variables Not in the Equation 
 
Step 4 Variables Score df Sig. 
 Black .077 1 .782 
 Hispanic .021 1 .884 
 Indian .215 1 .643 
 PacificIs .215 1 .643 
 F .642 1 .423 
 M .642 1 .423 
 AIG .199 1 .656 
 SES .540 1 .463 
 ELL .088 1 .766 
a. Residual Chi-Squares are not computed because of redundancies. 
 
The final best fit model produces the White variable statistics as follows, (B = .714, 
S.E. = .095, Wald = 56.33, df = 1, Sig. = .000, Exp(B) = 2.04) where B is the variable 
coefficient, S.E. is the standard error of measurement of the coefficient, the Wald statistic lets 
the researcher know if the B coefficient for that predictor is significantly different from zero 
(Field, n.d.).  The df statistic indicates degrees of freedom, Sig. is the p-value or significance 
level and the Exp(B) is the log ratio which is important in assessing the level of correlation 
between the predictive and dependent variables.  White students were significant at a p-value 
equal to .000.  The Exp(B) statistic is the most telling of the White variable statistics.  This 
statistic is interpreted to mean that white students are 2.04 times more likely than non-white 
students to be sitting in a classroom of a teacher that received the reading bonus. 
The Asian student variable reveals a similar statistic regarding a teacher’s likelihood 
of receiving the bonus.  This variable yields the following statistics (B = .723 S.E. = .172, 
Wald = 22.76, df = 1, Sig. = .000, Exp(B) = 2.473).  The Exp(B) statistic’s log ratio effect is 
somewhat mitigated by the larger S.E statistic and smaller Wald even though a p-value of 
.000 makes the Asian variable a significant predictor. The lower Wald statistic and the larger 
S.E. associated with the Asian independent variable stems from the fact that only 178 Asian 
students are present in the study compared to over 1900 white students warning the 
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researcher to interpret the Asian variable results more cautiously (Table 3.3).  But even with 
the Asian S.E. being larger than is the White variable’s, the Asian predictor variable is 
significant and points to a 2.06 times greater odds that an Asian student is sitting in a 
classroom with a reading teacher that received the bonus.  
Another demographic category flagged by the SPSS model for its positive correlation 
in the reading regression was the mixed race student variable (Mixed).  The statistics for 
mixed race students are (B = .351, S.E. = .170, Wald = 4.3, df = 1, Sig. = .039, Exp(B) = 
1.42).  Similar to the findings of Asian students, the margin of error (S.E.) is about twice as 
large as that for white students in large part due to the population size of mixed race students, 
189.  It is significant at the .039 level and the log ratio tells us that mixed race students are 
1.4 times as likely to be sitting in the classroom of a teacher that received the reading bonus 
in grades three through five. 
Finally, the SPSS forward stepwise regression applied the SWD or students with 
disabilities predictor variable into the model.  The SPSS SWD statistic reads as follows: (B = 
-3.01, S.E.  = .099, Wald = 9.22, df = 1, Sig. = .002, Exp(B) = .740)  The negative B 
coefficient makes the SWD variable difficult if not impossible to interpret.  It is significant at 
the .002 level but I will re-code the dependent variable in order to produce a statistic that is 
applicable and interpretable to the study.  This is the last significant variable to include in the 
forward stepwise approach.  In the Model Summary, (Appendix E) the “-2 Log Likelihood” 
is reduced with each addition of the identified predictor variables.  The smaller the “-2 Log 
Likelihood” the better the model predicts the dependent variable.  We can see in Step 4 of the 
“Variables not in the Equation” that there are no more significant variables to use in the 
regression since all are above the alpha significance level we set at .05 (Appendix E).   
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Table 4.2.a-d illustrates the logistic regression model for math teachers in grades four 
through eight with the following conditions.   
1. The dependent variable for Model 4.2.a-d is MTHB_1.  Once again for Table 
4.2, the dependent variable is coded as a “1” for teachers receiving the merit-
based bonus and “0” if the teacher did not. 
2. There is no third grade math pretest as there is with reading (the Beginning of 
Grade 3 Test or BOG3). Without a third grade math pretest, there is no student 
data by which to generate an EVAAS growth index for teachers of third grade 
math, and therefore, they are not eligible to receive a merit-based bonus for their 
work. 
3. Those students on the extended content standards taking the Extend 1 end of 
year exam in math are also not included in this data set as EVAAS does not 
calculate growth for the teachers of these students.    
Table 4.2.a-d 
SPSS Binary Logistic Regression – Grades 4-8 Math Dependent Variable Bonus Coded as 1: 
(MTHB _1) 
 
Table 4.2.a 
Block 1: Method = Forward Stepwise (Conditional) 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 
  Chi-Square df Sig. 
Step 5 Step 3.867 1 .049 
 Block 41.783 5 .000 
 Model 41.783 5 .000 
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Table 4.2.b 
Classification Table 
 
  
Observed 
MTHB_1 
.00 
Predicted 
1.00 
Percentage 
Correct  
Step 5 MTHB_1      .00 2670 68 97.5  
                     1.00 1684 68 3.9  
 Overall Percentage   61.0  
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Table 4.2.c 
Variables in the Equation 
 
 Ind. Var. B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 5e Black .462 .146 10.079 1 .001 1.588 
 Hispanic .188 .082 5.255 1 .022 1.207 
 Mixed .248 .125 3.908 1 .048 1.281 
 AIG -.231 .081 8.036 1 .005 .794 
 SWD -.382 .088 18.927 1 .000 .683 
 Constant -.414 .044 89.377 1 .000 .661 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: SWD. 
b. Variable(s) entered on step 2: AIG. 
c. Variable(s) entered on step 3: Black. 
d. Variable(s) entered on step 4: Hispanic. 
e. Variable(s) entered on step 5: Mixed. 
Table 4.2.d 
Variables Not in the Equation 
 
Step 5 Variables Score df Sig. 
 Asian .723 1 .395 
 Indian 1.050 1 .305 
 White .673 1 .412 
 PacificIs .323 1 .570 
 F .004 1 .950 
 M .004 1 .950 
 SES 1.481 1 .224 
 ELL .069 1 .793 
 Asian .723 1 .395 
a. Residual Chi-Squares are not computed because of redundancies. 
 
In the best fit math model (Table 4.2), several student characteristics manifest as 
significant.  Students that self-identify as racially mixed (Mixed), African American (Black) 
and Hispanic (Hispanic) are significant demographic variables as are students with learning 
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disabilities (SWD) and those identified as gifted (AIG).  Each is significant at a p-value < .05.  
In step 1 of the forward stepwise approach, SWD is the first variable added to the constant.  
The SWD statistics, after all significant predictor variables are added, are (B = -.382, S.E. = 
.088, Wald = 18.93, df = 1, Sig. = .000 and Exp(B) = .683).  As with the SWD variable in the 
RDGB_1 regression (Table 4.1) a negative B coefficient makes this statistic unusable.  
However, because of its significance level, I will recode the dependent variable and rerun the 
forward stepwise logistic regression to see if there is a Exp(B) relationship between SWD and 
a teacher’s likelihood of receiving a math bonus.  Another explanatory non-demographic 
statistic that proves significant is students that have been identified for the Academically and 
Intellectually Gifted (AIG) program in the chosen school system.  The statistics for AIG are 
(B = -.231, S.E. = .081, Wald = 8.04, df = 1, Sig. = .005 and Exp(B) = .794).  There are 864 
students in this student population that yields a relatively small S.E. statistic.  However, like 
with the SWD predictor variable, the negative coefficient makes this an uninterpretable 
statistic.  However, I will review this once again in Table 4.4 when the dependent variable 
coding is flipped. 
Reviewing once again the frequency chart (Table 3.3), there are 286 students of an 
ethnically mixed race background (Mixed) used in the math teacher bonus logistic regression 
model.  The Mixed variable was a significant predictor of teachers receiving the math bonus 
(B = .248, S.E. = .125, Wald = 3.91, df = 1, Sig. = .048 and Exp(B) = 1.28).  The Mixed 
predictor variable has an Exp(B) predictive odds measurement of 1.28.  This indicates that a 
mixed race child is 1.28 times more likely to have a teacher that received the math bonus 
than the average child.  The African American variable (Black) statistics are  (B = .462, S.E. 
= .146, Wald = 10.08, df = 1, Sig. = .001 and Exp(B) = 1.588).  A black student is 1.6 times 
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as likely to be sitting in a classroom where the teacher received a math bonus at the end of 
the year.  An Hispanic child (Hispanic) reveals these statistics (B = .188, S.E. = .082, Wald = 
5.23, df = 1, Sig. = .022 and Exp(B) = 1.21).  We can read this to mean that an Hispanic child 
is 1.2 times as likely to be in a teacher’s class that received the math bonus. 
Results Continued: Reversing the Dependent Variable Coding 
 As a result of the first two forward stepwise models yielding statistics with negative 
coefficients, and log ratios, Exp(B) less than one, I altered the coding of the dependent 
variables by coding teachers that received the bonus with “0” and those who did not with a 
“1”.  This provides me with some descriptor variables yielding more meaningfully 
interpretive statistics that can inform my research question.  The same conditions outlined in 
the first two models hold true in the reading Table 4.3 and math Table 4.4 with the only 
change being the inverse coding of the dependent variables. 
Table 4.3.a-d 
SPSS Binary Logistic Regression – Grades 3-5 Reading: Dependent Variable Bonus Coded 
as 0: (RDGB _0) 
 
Table 4.3.a 
Block 1: Method = Forward Stepwise (Conditional) 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 
  Chi-Square df Sig. 
Step 5 Step 3.867 1 .049 
 Block 41.783 5 .000 
 Model 41.783 5 .000 
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Table 4.3.b 
Classification Table 
 
  
Observed 
RDGB_1 
.00 
Predicted 
1.00 
Percentage 
Correct  
Step 4 RDGB_0      .00 885 462 65.7  
                1.00 822 756 47.9  
 Overall Percentage   56.1  
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Table 4.3.c 
Variables in the Equation 
 
 Ind. Var. B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 4 Asian -.723 .172 17.751 1 .000 .485 
 Mixed -.351 .170 4.265 1 .039 .704 
 White -.714 .095 56.327 1 .000 .490 
 SWD .301 .099 9.245 1 .002 1.351 
 Constant .643 .085 57.765 1 .000 1.902 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: White. 
b. Variable(s) entered on step 2: Asian. 
c. Variable(s) entered on step 3: SWD. 
d. Variable(s) entered on step 4: Mixed. 
 
Table 4.3.d 
Variables Not in the Equation 
 
Step 4 Variables Score df Sig. 
 Black .077 1 .782 
 Hispanic .021 1 .884 
 Indian .215 1 .643 
 PacificIs .215 1 .643 
 F .642 1 .423 
 M .642 1 .423 
 AIG .199 1 .656 
 SES .540 1 .463 
 ELL .088 1 .766 
a. Residual Chi-Squares are not computed because of redundancies. 
 
As with Table 4.1, the Chi-square statistic (Appendix F) illustrates that by Step 4, 
70.23% of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the best-fit model.  The 
sign of the B coefficients have flipped with this model where Asian and White students are 
negative, but this time, the SWD variable reveals a positive coefficient.  The Exp(B) reflects 
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an odds ratio of 1.35 for students with disabilities (SWD).  Deciphering the odds ratio 
illustrates a 1.35 times likelihood that a student with a disability is sitting in the reading class 
of a teacher that did not receive the reading bonus.  There are 526 SWD (Table 3.3) students 
that took the EOG reading test across the county in grade three through five in 2017-18 
yielding a standard error of .099.   
Table 4.4.a-d 
SPSS Binary Logistic Regression – Grades 4-8 Math: Dependent Variable Bonus Coded as 
0: (MTHB _0) 
 
Table 4.4.a 
Block 1: Method = Forward Stepwise (Conditional) 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 
  Chi-Square df Sig. 
Step 5 Step 3.867 1 .049 
 Block 41.783 5 .000 
 Model 41.783 5 .000 
 
 
Table 4.4.b 
Classification Table 
 
  
Observed 
MTHB_1 
.00 
Predicted 
1.00 
Percentage 
Correct  
Step 5 MTHB_0      .00 2670 68 97.5  
                     1.00 1684 68 3.9  
 Overall Percentage   61.0  
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Table 4.4.c 
Variables in the Equation 
 
 Ind. Var. B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 5e Black -.462 .146 10.079 1 .001 .630 
 Hispanic -.188 .082 5.255 1 .022 .829 
 Mixed -.248 .125 3.908 1 .048 .781 
 AIG .231 .081 8.036 1 .005 1.260 
 SWD .382 .088 18.927 1 .000 1.465 
 Constant .414 .044 89.377 1 .000 1.513 
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a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: SWD. 
b. Variable(s) entered on step 2: AIG. 
c. Variable(s) entered on step 3: Black. 
d. Variable(s) entered on step 4: Hispanic. 
e. Variable(s) entered on step 5: Mixed. 
Table 4.4.d 
Variables Not in the Equation 
 
Step 5 Variables Score df Sig. 
 Asian .723 1 .395 
 Indian 1.050 1 .305 
 White .673 1 .412 
 PacificIs .323 1 .570 
 F .004 1 .950 
 M .004 1 .950 
 SES 1.481 1 .224 
 ELL .069 1 .793 
 Asian .723 1 .395 
a. Residual Chi-Squares are not computed because of redundancies. 
 
To address the negative B coefficient in the Table 4.2 math regression, the dependent 
variable MTHB_0 is recoded as a “0” for a teacher receiving the math bonus, and a “1” for a 
teacher that did not receive the bonus in grades four through eight.  This reverse coding 
should yield a positive correlation between students that are labeled AIG or SWD and 
teachers not receiving the math bonus.  Again, we see identical Chi-square, p-value, and S.E. 
statistics as we did with the math regression in Table 4.2. However, the sign of the B 
coefficients has flipped and the Exp(B) statistic is yielding an interpretable statistic for both 
variables.  The SWD log ratio (Exp(B)) of 1.47 means that a student with a disability is 1.5 
times as likely to be sitting in a math teacher’s class that will not receive a bonus for her 
math instruction.  A positive log ratio of 1.26 exists with the Exp(B) statistics for a gifted 
student (AIG). Here again we see a positive relationship between the AIG log ratio and a 
teacher not receiving the math bonus. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
Introduction  
The postpositivist seeks to assess causes that influence outcomes as she tries to 
reduce ideas into testable hypothesis in the search to find truth and explain the world in 
which she lives (Creswell, 2005).  In this postpositivist vein, Phillips and Barbules (2000) see 
the role of the researcher as one where she advances the relationship among variables by 
developing questions or hypothesis.  As a postpositivist researcher trying to uncover truths, I 
will identify relationships and correlations in this chapter’s analysis section between the 
dependent variable, teachers receiving merit-based bonuses in math and reading, and the 
independent predictor variables made up of student characteristic groups in this exploratory 
study. 
Next, I will review the literature connections that eventually narrowed my focus of 
study to my research question.  In the literature review, I identified gaps where a study of 
merit-based pay in North Carolina’s public schools was warranted.  Through this research 
process and data gathering, I have identified several limitations with the EVAAS instrument 
and the merit-based pay system based on EVAAS teacher growth indices.  The research by 
Baker et al. (2010) on non-random student assignment and Burke and Sass’ (2014) study 
which identified peer effects and their influence on student learning outcomes both served as 
conceptual frameworks for this study.  These studies provide critiques of a VAM’s ability to 
accurately identify effective teachers for high stakes decision-making including merit-based 
bonuses.  I will use the lens provided by these frameworks to review the findings in my 
study.  The implications of this research in the landscape of educational policy and merit-
based pay proposals may warrant future research in this subject.  These ideas will be 
discussed in greater detail throughout the chapter. 
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Analysis-Literature Links 
 
Quantitative research is an inquiry-based approach useful for describing trends and 
explaining the relationship among variables found in the literature (Creswell, 2005).  To 
conduct this inquiry the investigator specifies narrow questions, and analyzes numbers from 
the instruments using statistics (Mertler & Charles, 2005).  From the results of these 
analyses, the researcher interprets the data using prior predictions and research studies.  The 
final report, presented in a standard format, displays a researcher’s objectivity and a lack of 
bias (Creswell, 2005, p. 597).  Following Creswell’s ideas on objectivity (2005), I have 
compiled and formatted the student characteristic data that serve as the focus of my study.  
William Sanders, the founder of the TVAAS and EVAAS statistical models, has 
claimed throughout his VAM publications that a student’s personal testing history provides 
its own controls when trying to isolate teacher impact on student learning that Sanders 
referred to as “blocking” (Sanders & Wright, 2009).  Furthermore, Sanders and Horn (1998) 
made the claim that race, socioeconomic level, class size, and classroom heterogeneity are 
poor predictors of student academic growth (p. 1).  It was Sanders’ own research that 
informed the creation of my null hypothesis that there is no impactful and statistically 
significant student characteristic variable, to a .05 significance level, that accounts for a 
teacher having a better chance than another teacher to earn a merit-based bonus in math or 
reading based on the composition of students in her classroom.  However, my research 
findings do not support the assumption of the null hypothesis.  As an impartial researcher, I 
am ready to reject the null hypothesis as my findings reveal that both reading and math 
growth, as measured by EVAAS, are correlated to different student characteristics present in 
a teacher’s classroom (Table 5.1).  Is the likelihood of a North Carolina teacher receiving 
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incentive pay impacted by the student characteristics prevalent in his/her classroom?  The 
research question that drove my work can be answered in the affirmative.  There are some 
student characteristics that are positively correlated and others that are negatively correlated 
with a teacher’s likelihood to receive the reading and math merit-based bonuses in North 
Carolina. 
Table 5.1  
Result Summaries for Significant and Impactful Variables - Math and Reading 
Independent Variables Subject Correlation Odds Ratio 
[Exp(B)] 
Standard Error 
Asian (Asian) Reading Positive 2.1 .172 
Mixed Race (Mixed) Reading Positive 1.4 .170 
White (White) Reading Positive 2.0 .095 
Students with Disabilities (SWD) Reading Negative 1.4 .099 
     
African-American (Black) Math Positive 1.6 .146 
Hispanic (Hispanic) Math Positive 1.2 .082 
Mixed Race (Mixed) Math Positive 1.3 .125 
Academically/Intellectually Gifted (AIG) Math Negative 1.5 .081 
Students with Disabilities (SWD) Math Negative 1.3 .088 
 
 Starting with the grade three through five reading teachers eligible to receive the state 
bonus for being in the top 25% of teachers in the state as measured by the EVAAS growth 
index, four predictor variables emerged as significant at a p-value < .05 (Table 5.1).  These 
were the demographic variables of students being white, mixed-race or Asian, and the 
student characteristic of being served by the exceptional children’s program (SWD).   
Based on my findings, a reading teacher in grade three through five is more likely to 
receive the merit-based bonus if she has more mixed-race, white and Asian students in her 
classroom irrespective of her teaching talents.  Newton et al. (2010) found in their research 
that VAM models like EVAAS showed positive correlations between Asian students and 
teachers whose students have come from educated parents.  My research supports their 
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findings on Asian students and their correlation with teacher growth.  I do not have any data 
on parent education by which to confirm or challenge the Newton et al. study (2010).  I do 
not have any specific data from the LEA where the study was conducted that would tie 
mixed-race or white students to a parent education variable in order to make a claim as to the 
reason these two variables are linked to teacher success.   
The summer learning loss phenomenon was chronicled and studied by Darling-
Hammond et al. (2012) as a reason that poorer students fall behind their peers academically, 
and why growth for these students manifests at a lower rate.  However, under the EVAAS 
model, students are measured against their own testing histories year to year and teachers 
assume responsibility for these students’ “growth” even though these students’ learning may 
have regressed over the summer before they stepped foot in that teacher’s classroom.  
“Summer learning loss” is associated with those students living in households of poverty 
(SES).  In the county where I conducted my research, there is substantial overlap in the SES 
and SWD variables.  Students that are served in the SWD program are often served by the 
free and reduced lunch program as well. This may explain in part why there is a negative 
association between teachers receiving the bonus and the students with learning disabilities 
sitting in their classrooms.  Darling-Hammond and her colleagues (2012) also point to the 
fact that the end-of-year assessments are written on grade level although much of the 
instruction for SWD students happens below grade level.  Summer learning loss and below 
grade level instruction may both be accounting for the negative correlation that exists 
between students with disabilities and the ability of their teachers to earn the state-allocated 
reading bonus. 
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With affluence comes a family’s ability to provide tutoring for their child outside the 
school.  This logic might manifest with the existence of a significant and negative correlation 
between the SES variable that serves as a proxy for student poverty, and the likelihood of a 
teacher earning the bonus.  However, in the regression models for math and reading, I did not 
find this to be true (Newton et al., 2010).  With this line of thinking, I would have also 
expected the AIG subgroup to be a significant and important variable in a teacher’s likelihood 
of receiving the bonus as well, but this was not the case in either the reading or math 
regression models.  On the contrary, with the math regression models, the AIG predictor 
variable proved to be negatively correlated with a teacher’s ability to receive the bonus.  This 
may point less to the peer effect espoused by Hanushek et al. (2003), and more to the ceiling 
effect chronicled in Collins and Amrein-Beardsley (2014) and Sanders, Saxton, and Horn’s 
research studies (1997).  
Baker et al. (2010) would argue that certain teachers are given preferential treatment 
in the students assigned to their classrooms when principals allot these teachers high 
performing students.  Most teachers enjoy teaching gifted and talented students and may even 
petition their principal to teach classroom clusters of students with the gifted and talented 
label.  The classroom discussions where gifted students are present, the gifted students’ 
ability to grasp concepts more quickly, and the higher-level student interactions that happen 
in classrooms where these students reside are rewarding classroom dynamics for most 
teachers.  On the other hand, teaching students with disabilities often proves difficult for 
many teachers.  Implementing differentiated lesson planning and providing creative 
instructional strategies are challenges for teachers serving students with learning disabilities.  
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From the student’s perspective, frustration can emerge as special education (SWD) students 
struggle to internalize complex learning concepts.   
When Baker et al. (2010) referenced preferential student-teacher assignments, they 
were referring to teachers being assigned more high achievers in their classrooms and fewer 
students that struggled with their learning or struggled with the English language.  My 
findings in the math regression do not support the conceptual framework findings of Baker et 
al. (2010) when it comes to gifted students since their assignment to a classroom actually 
hindered a teacher’s likelihood of receiving the math bonus.  The researchers’ ideas on the 
SWD subgroups, however, were upheld as their assignment to a teacher’s classroom worked 
against a teacher’s quest to receive the state-appointed math bonus.  On the other hand, if a 
student is being compared to their own testing history in EVAAS as Sanders et al. (1997) 
have laid out, then could the argument reasonably be made that these students have more 
room for growth then a gifted student already performing at the 97th percentile?  As a 
reminder, this finding does not indicate that these SWD students are not performing on grade 
level (although most are not), only that their teachers are impacting their learning at a lesser 
percentage than their peers.   
Of course, the quantitative researcher must be cautious in ascribing causal 
connections between variables.  However, students with disabilities in my study are 1.5 times 
more likely to be sitting in a math teacher’s class who did not receive the math bonus.  This 
relationship exists despite all the learning supports these SWD students receive in this public 
school setting. 
• They frequently work in a small group instructional setting.   
• They often receive after school remediation. 
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• They have an individual education plan (IEP) that focuses their learning on prescribed 
and personal learning targets.   
• They receive push in and/or pull out services from an exceptional children’s teacher 
for a prescribed number of minutes each week in addition to the instruction they 
receive from their regular education teacher. 
• The school must also comply with testing accommodations such as additional time 
and multiple test sessions for in class and end of year state assessments including the 
“test read aloud” option with the math assessment for students who have a reading or 
math disability. 
In the county where this research was conducted, teachers are to provide 45 minutes 
of instruction in the core-reading program to all students.  This instruction is delivered in 
heterogeneously grouped classrooms where students of all academic levels are working 
together.  Is it reasonable to assume that positive peer effects would manifest as these SWD 
students work alongside and with gifted learners who model high level thinking, fluency, and 
articulation (Hanushek, Kain, Markman, & Rivkin, 2003)?   With the employment of the 
SWD teaching strategies chronicled here we would expect to see growth with these at-risk 
students groups.  However, even with these supports, it was not enough to overcome the 
learning issues they bring with them each day to the reading teacher’s classroom.  The 
findings of this study parallel those of Baker et al. (2010) concerning students with 
disabilities.  My research reveals that the SWD subgroup has a negative correlation to their 
teachers’ likelihood of receiving the North Carolina merit-based bonuses in reading.  
Students with the SWD label are 1.4 times as likely to be sitting in a teacher’s classroom that 
did not receive the reading bonus. 
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 The binary logistic regression yielded five significant and impactful variables when 
predicting the likelihood of a math teacher in grades four through eight receiving a bonus 
based on the student characteristic makeup of her class.  For math, these significant and 
important variables were the ethnic variables Mixed, Black, and Hispanic, and the student 
characteristics AIG and SWD.  Although less common than reading disabilities, some of the 
students that make up the SWD subgroup have a mathematics disability.  However, students 
with math and reading disabilities on their IEP’s or students who have an English Learner 
education plan due to their scoring less than a 5.0 on the WIDA ACCESS language 
proficiency test are often provided the testing accommodation known as read-aloud.  This 
accommodation allows the computer, for online testing, or a teacher if designated in the 
personal educational plan, to read the EOG test questions aloud to the students.  In theory, 
this accommodation permits student comprehension of the math word problems without 
struggling with the reading decoding challenges these questions can present on EOG math 
tests, especially to students with learning disabilities.   
The SPSS math statistics show that Hispanic students are 1.2 times as likely to be in a 
teacher’s classroom that received the math bonus.  Although not all Hispanic students are 
served by the ELL program, about half of them are served in grades three through eight.  The 
read-aloud accommodation may account in part for the positive correlation between Hispanic 
students and teachers receiving the math bonus.  Of course, we might expect to see the ELL 
predictor variable to reveal a significant relationship with the dependent variable if this were 
the case, but the ELL variable is not significant in either study.  One would reason this same 
logic would be reflected in the SWD predictor variable and it positively impacting a teacher’s 
ability to receive the math bonus.  However, actually the opposite is true.  Students with 
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disabilities, even with the read aloud math test accommodation, were actually 1.5 times more 
likely to be sitting in a classroom where the teachers did not receive the math bonus.   
Carnoy and Garcia (2017) found that the overarching determinant of student learning 
as measured by test score proficiency was not race but socio-economic class.  My study 
reveals in the math logistic regressions that historically poor subgroups, Black, Hispanic, and 
Mixed race students have from a 1.3 to 1.6 times greater likelihood of sitting in a classroom 
where a teacher received the bonus but the SES variable does not manifest as significant in 
the math or reading regression models. What might account for this phenomenon that seems 
to contradict Carnoy and Garcia (2017)?   Only 286 students of 4490 fourth through eighth 
graders identified as mixed race, 779 as Hispanic, and 205 as African-American (Table 3.3).  
With larger standard errors (Table 4.4) these predictor variable results should be viewed with 
some level of caution in assigning any type of correlation let alone causation.   
One independent variable appears to work counterintuitive to Burke and Sass (2013) 
in their peer effect research.  The math logistic regression model (Table 4.4) reveals that AIG 
students have a negative correlation with their teacher’s ability to receive the math bonus.  
They are 1.3 times as likely to be sitting in a math teacher’s classroom that did not receive 
the bonus.   It is safe to assume that the ceiling effect may be handicapping math teachers of 
gifted students from achieving high growth numbers in the county I studied (Collins & 
Amrein-Beardsley, 2014; Sanders, Saxton, & Horn, 1997).  
Revisiting William Sanders’ VAM ideas (Sanders et al,1997), he believed that it 
would not be necessary to include SES, demographic, or other student characteristic variables 
in his model because they were already baked into the students’ individual testing histories.  
Sanders believed his model could get at the direct teacher effects on the students’ learning by 
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employing the experimental design principle of  “blocking,” which in essence used each 
student’s prior achievement as the only proxy for future test results (Kupermintz, Shepard, & 
Linn, 2001, p. 6).  The logistic regression work I completed in a western North Carolina rural 
county would challenge this blocking theory approach to the EVAAS growth model.  If the 
blocking phenomenon were to hold true, I would have been able to accept the null hypothesis 
since no student characteristic variable would have showed a significance of p < .05.  
However, many predictor variables proved to be significant and impactful.  As a result of this 
finding, I feel comfortable in saying that a student’s own testing history is insufficient to 
accurately predict student growth, and subsequently, those student characteristics are 
influential in a teacher’s likelihood of receiving the math and reading state-appointed 
bonuses.  Consequently, rewarding North Carolina teachers based on the growth index 
calculated by EVAAS may be unduly influenced by the student characteristics present in her 
classroom. 
Addressing the Gaps 
While conducting my literature review for this study, I focused on three areas.  The 
first was the viability of using the VAM tool EVAAS for a purpose for which it was not 
designed – assigning teacher merit pay.  Sanders designed EVAAS to measure teacher 
impact on student learning regardless of the student’s starting point since the student is being 
measured against his own testing history (2003).  He hoped that educators would use the 
reporting mechanism EVAAS provides teachers to reflect on their teaching and to improve 
on their craft.  Sanders hoped that teachers would dive into EVAAS’ diagnostic reports that 
illustrate how teachers have served the different academic tertiles of students that cross 
through their classroom doors (Table 5.2) (Sanders & Horn, 2009).  However, as several 
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researchers have lamented, EVAAS has instead been utilized for high stakes decisions linked 
to salary supplements and teacher dismissal (Amrein-Bearsley, Pivovarova, & Geiger, 2016; 
Amrein-Beardsley, & Collins, 2012; Eckert, & Dabrowski, 2010).   
I also focused a part of my research on student assignment to classrooms.  A 
supposition underlying all VAM models is a random assignment of students to classrooms.  
Research shows us that this is not what principals do however when making student 
classroom assignments (Baker et al. 2010; Dixit, 2002; Heinrich & Marschke, 2010; 
Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). 
Finally, I looked at teacher merit-based pay and its origins in public education as a 
means to motivate teachers, retain talented ones, and attract the best and brightest to the 
practice (Ballou & Podgursky, 1998; Springer & Taylor, 2016).  However, I was unable to 
find research specific to North Carolina on the performance-based pay that was instituted in 
the state with the 2016-2017 school year and the fairness by which these bonuses were 
applied.  Although merit-based pay is available also for career-technical education teachers 
and teachers of Advanced Placement high school courses, I focused my research on the math 
and reading bonuses allocated by the NC General Assembly Session Law in grades three 
through eight.  The purpose for focusing on grades three through eight lies in the fact that all 
students in these grades take the EOG reading and math tests which provides a perfect cross 
section of the population, unlike Advanced Placement courses where teacher growth is not 
calculated and where the courses are catered to the most accomplished students.  CTE 
courses are self-selected and do not offer the same sampling of students characteristics to 
conduct a meaningful study.  Since studies were scarce or non-existent on the topic of merit-
based pay, specifically a quantitative review of the way student characteristics affect a 
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teacher’s likelihood of receiving the merit-based bonus in North Carolina, I identified this 
gap as something worthy of study.  As a result, I developed a quantitative methodology that 
would assess in part the fairness of the merit-based pay, and moreover a methodology that 
would answer my research question.  Is the likelihood of a North Carolina teacher receiving 
incentive pay impacted by the student characteristics prevalent in his/her classroom? 
Limitations 
There are several limitations that I have identified while cleaning the data, running 
the regressions, and analyzing the results.  One is in the way that the student data system 
assigns students to reading teachers.  Reading teachers are matched backed to their students 
in the state testing software (WinScan) for test score reporting purposes.  The student data 
portal, PowerSchool, identifies reading teachers as the Grade_X_Reading (X being the grade 
of the students) reading teacher.  This PowerSchool designation of reading teacher is 
typically the “teacher-directed reading” teacher.  The teacher-directed reading block is the 
period of instructional time when a teacher teaches a class of heterogeneously grouped 
students working from a core-reading program or basal written on grade level.  However, in 
the county where the research was conducted, students also participate in ability-grouped 
guided-reading groups.  They listen and interact daily with their teacher during teacher read-
alouds, and they have self-sustained silent reading that often involves teacher-student 
conferencing.  Students may be served by their homeroom teacher the entire day.  This is 
common in third grade.  However, the students might be served by more than one of the 
teachers in the grade level, especially in fourth and fifth grades.  Yet the data that was 
collected and provided to me has one reading teacher assigned to one student.  Although one 
reading teacher is primarily tied to a student in the state bonus structure, several have an 
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effect on his reading growth.  This is a prime example of the spillage effect introduced in 
Chapter One (Corcoran, 2010; Koedel 2009, Yuan, 2015).    
The EVAAS tool does permit several teachers to claim instructional responsibility for 
students even though they are not assigned as the student’s teacher in the teacher-directed 
reading block.  However, the data available to me only shows teachers assigned to students 
through this teacher-directed match.  In other words, the students in grades three through 
eight are often served by multiple reading teachers, but only one teacher is assigned to one 
student in this study.   
In the four regression models, there are some variables that are manifesting as 
significant and impactful but have a small population as can be seen in Table 3.3 – 
Frequency Table for Math and Reading Bonus, Student Population.  The Mixed, Black, and 
Hispanic variables in math and the Asian variable with the reading regression are the obvious 
examples.  How should these small population independent predictor variables be 
interpreted?  Is there an insufficient N that causes a large S.E. that should produce caution in 
interpreting the results? 
Another limitation to the research findings relates to the results being generalizable 
and repeatable?  The methods are repeatable, but I don’t know that the results would be.  If 
the findings yielded different significant and important variables in a similar study in Carteret 
County or in Charlotte, does that mean that my methodology is not sound or valid?  I do not 
think that it would invalidate the methodology since there are so many cultural factors, 
professional development opportunities, population differences, and teaching talent variances 
between LEA’s across the state.  However, if the study is repeated elsewhere, and the 
impactful and significant variables differ, this too adds credence to this study.   The EVAAS 
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results would again prove a bias toward a particular student characteristic set.  Therefore, the 
bonus system tied to Sanders’ VAM that assumes student testing histories are sufficient to 
construct teacher growth measures is flawed for its use in assigning teacher merit pay 
(Darling-Hammond, Amrein-Beardsley, & Rothstein, 2012; Sanders, 1998). 
Revisiting the Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework for this study was based on two studies.  The first was the 
work of Baker et al. (2010) and their concerns about VAM model efficacy outside the bounds 
of random student assignment.  I also considered the work of Burke and Sass (2013) who 
studied positive peer effects that occur for lower and average achieving students when they 
are grouped with gifted students, and the negative peer effects that occur when lower 
achieving students are homogenously grouped during the bulk of their instructional time.  
Homogenous student grouping is a more common practice in the middle schools represented 
in this study where students are often tracked with similar-ability peers for most of their 
instructional day.  It is less prevalent in elementary schools, although it happens there also.  I 
took the non-random assignment of students as a given in this rural county.  Students are 
often clustered in classrooms by their ELL classifications, by their learning disabilities, and 
by parent requests for teachers.  Since non-random student assignment is more common than 
not, my research would reveal if Sanders ideas on “blocking” would be sufficient to not 
disadvantage any teacher with the student characteristics prevalent in her classroom. 
Baker et al. (2010) expressed concerns over merit-based pay structures where 
students were not randomly assigned to class.  A compliment to this theory is the principal-
agent theory (Dixit, 2002; Heinrich & Marschke, 2010; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991) that 
suggests principals are purposely not assigning students randomly as they try to maximize 
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student outputs, assigning student to teachers based on teaching style, student acumen, or 
parent requests.  The researchers’ concerns appear justified as I found five independent 
variables in math and four in reading that were significant and positively or negatively 
correlated with teachers’ likelihood of receiving the reading and math bonus.  The ceiling 
effect appears to have manifested with AIG students in the math regression where teachers of 
these bright students were handicapped from achieving sufficiently high EVAAS indexes 
necessary to qualify for the merit-based bonus (Collins & Amrein-Beardsley, 2014; Sanders 
& Horn, 1998).  The positive peer effects documented by Hanushek et al. (2003) for students 
lucky enough to be with the academically gifted student cluster and the teachers who reap the 
growth rewards are not factored into the EVAAS model, nor are the negative peer effects 
when clusters of low achieving students populate a classroom (Burke & Sass, 2013; 
Sacerdote, 2011).  In neither study did the SES variable show up as significant that might 
prove some peer effect was prevalent in improving the growth of students in poverty.  In the 
study, AIG students only surfaced as significant and important in the math model, and here 
they were negatively correlated with teacher growth.  It would be impossible to decipher 
from this study if the presence of gifted students helped to raise the performance of other 
students in their classrooms assuming that heterogeneity of student abilities is common in 
these classrooms.  Therefore, it may be that the ceiling effect manifested in these math 
classrooms. The AIG student subgroup did not appear to advantage the teachers that served 
them in the way of merit bonuses.    
Although it would be difficult to separate out the peer effects and the non-random 
student assignments in this quantitative study, a future mixed methods study where principal 
surveys and interviews were coupled with the quantitative analysis may further inform the 
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research question related to teacher merit-based bonuses and how they are related to principal 
classroom assignment practices. 
Implications of the Research 
A study, if its results are valid and reliable, should have generalizable findings.  At 
the district level, this means that the findings might be applied to current county policy and 
procedures.  Today, there are more procedures than there are policies related to student-
teacher assignment in the county where this study was conducted.  The LEA has contracted 
with Harvard and Columbia Universities over the last three years to provide training to a 
sample of its teachers and administrators in the art of differentiated instruction, focusing 
primarily on how to plan and provide instruction for their neediest learners.  There has also 
been a push in elementary school for small group guided-math instruction that target learning 
needs for students’ in their specific areas of deficit.  Several of the elementary schools 
participated in an after school grant that allowed for 60 minutes of guided instruction 
provided by quality math and reading teachers to serve at-risk students through a McKinney-
Vento federal grant and additional grants written through NCDPI.   
In this LEA there are stipulations for state and locally provided teacher training that 
must be successfully completed if those teachers are to serve AIG students in grades three 
through eight.  These teachers would have completed local and state training modules that 
qualify them for the job of teaching gifted students.  This AIG certification hurdle often 
handcuffs principals who may otherwise randomly assign these AIG students to grade level 
classrooms.  ELL and SWD students are frequently grouped for the purpose of inclusion co-
teaching in most schools across the LEA.  The inclusion model works best when an ELL or 
SWD teacher comes into the regular education classroom and works alongside the classroom 
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teacher in a co-teaching model, that ideally supplements student learning opportunities.  It is 
hard to conduct push-in services for these ELL and SWD students if they are spread 
throughout the grade level.  The inclusion teachers cannot be in two classrooms at one time 
to serve all their students’ IEP-specific learning needs.  This is yet another reason why non-
random student clustering often occurs in these classrooms. 
Implications at the LEA Level 
If special education students are disadvantaging a teacher’s ability to receive a bonus, 
will the district have to re-consider the clustering of SWD and ELL students that allows for 
inclusion services to be rendered?  Implications for the LEA will involve having discussions 
among district stakeholders concerning the way students are assigned to classes.  The 
superintendent of the LEA where this study was conducted often says that leaders in the 
education community should be making decisions based on student services, not staff 
convenience.  In regard to this principle, the curriculum and student service professionals, 
along with principals, teachers, and parents, must have dialogue about what learning scenario 
is best for students when assigning students to teachers.  However, this discussion will have 
to be conducted also with an eye to the merit-based pay initiatives the state has established 
for teacher compensation.  If principal-agent theory is informing student-teacher assignment 
practices based on what is assumed to be best for students, would this practice disadvantage a 
teacher’s opportunity to earn a merit-based bonus because she happens to be effective at 
teaching special education students (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991)?  Although she may be 
the best teacher for this group of students, the odds of her receiving the bonus are 
compromised when she has this group of SWD students in her classroom.   
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Another local concern that may manifest when bonuses upward of $7000 are at stake 
is that teachers may move to grade levels and schools where they feel opportunities for pay 
bonuses are most likely.  District leaders will have to be cautious about honoring the requests 
of effective teachers to move out of primary grade classrooms (Kindergarten – 2nd) where 
state and local bonuses are not available, to upper elementary grades or middle school 
classrooms where bonuses are available.  This top-heavy system may severely handicap a 
school system’s responsibility to have students reading on grade level before they come to 
the “tested grades” (Grades 3-8).  If teachers were to internalize this research, I do not predict 
a danger of their looking to move between schools since all schools in the system have 
students with disabilities, the group that I have chronicled is correlated to classrooms where 
teachers did not receive math and reading bonuses.  In addition, all schools have gifted 
students that are negatively correlated with teacher math bonuses.  In fact, reason might 
suppose that teachers may look to leave higher SES communities where AIG student 
classification is more prevalent.  Again, since we know that teachers are not solely driven by 
monetary rewards, I would not expect great migrations of teachers between schools although 
there may be some in-school grade level change requests (Guskey, 2017; Player, 2010). 
After learning of the results of this research, what type of trainings will the LEA offer 
to its teachers?  Will there be further differentiation training focused on the learning needs of 
its SWD subgroups based on instructional strategies in math and reading?  Will they offer 
training on classroom management practices that instructors must master to maximize 
instructional minutes for those teachers whose EVAAS growth index is not meeting at least 
the state average, 0.0?  Will the LEA leadership choose to dive deeper into the EVAAS 
instrument, focusing on the reports offered there to reflect on teaching practices that must be 
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modified based on the diagnostic reports available to the grade level and individual teacher 
levels.  The diagnostic report in table 5.2 shows a grade level report that is illustrating 
quintile student groups rather than teacher-level reports that are reported in tertile groupings. 
Table 5.2  
School Quintile Growth Table for the 2017-2018 and 2018-2019 School Years 
* Excerpted from EVAAS ®SAS diagnostic school level reporting 
 
The blue bars (first of each pair) indicate data from the most recent year, 2018-2019 
student data, and the gold (the second of each pair), student and grade level growth data from 
2017-2018, the year the research was completed.  Reading the 2018-2019 data from this 
particular school, the most substantial growth occurred with the students that were predicted 
to perform in the 80th to 99th percentile and the 20th to 40th percentiles.  The least student 
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growth occurred in the 0th to 20th percentile and the 60th to 80th percentile student groups.  
The 0.0 horizontal mid-line on the table represents the state value added growth measure.  In 
other words, this line marks the level where 50% of the teachers finish with a growth 
measure above this line and 50% of teachers below.  Although this table strictly reflects 
grade level quintiles and not student characteristics, the diagnostic tables in EVAAS can be 
constructed to reflect quintile growth by student characteristic groups as well.  In creating 
Table 5.2, I chose all students in a particular school and grade level so that there would be 
data sufficient to reflect growth indices in each quintile (a minimum of five student scores is 
needed to populate each quintile).   
Sanders created EVAAS with the idea that it would provide for teacher reports 
enabling them to reflect on their teaching practices.  These diagnostic tables do just that.  At 
the grade level, subject area, and teacher levels, these reports allow teachers and principals to 
see which groups of students they were most successful in serving, and then to evaluate how 
to lesson plan in the current year to appropriately serve the learning needs of each student 
group.  Although I did not select student groups down to the student characteristic level in 
Table 5.2, this option is available to teachers in the EVAAS software.  Teachers also have the 
capability to access reports in EVAAS that illustrate which student groups grew the most and 
which grew the least as reflected by the value-added measure.  I imagine that Sanders would 
have relished the opportunity to be involved in the professional learning community data 
meetings where these reports were created and discussed and student learning needs 
dissected in the search for improved instructional practices.    
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Implications at the State Level 
At the state level, if this study is indeed generalizable and repeatable, the implications 
should involve an intentional review of the merit-based pay system adopted by the North 
Carolina General Assembly.  Although the goal of rewarding the most effective teachers is 
laudable, is the method the state is using to identify those teachers fair and focused on what is 
best for students (Amrein-Beardsley, 2014)?  The bulk of current VAM research is critical of 
VAM models like EVAAS.  However, despite these research findings, do the ends (teacher 
effectiveness) justify the means (using the EVAAS tool to evaluate teacher impact), if it can 
be found that student learning has been positively impacted by the incentives the bonuses are 
providing to North Carolina’s teachers?  Another goal of the bonus pay legislation that 
lawmakers must review is how effective the merit pay plan has been at attracting and keeping 
teacher talent.  What positive impacts are these bonuses having on teacher retention and on 
attracting better professionals to the business of public education?  A cost-benefit analysis 
where student results are measured against the cost of the merit-based program may be 
warranted at the state level to see if the state is truly getting appropriate results for the 
monetary investment of taxpayer dollars. 
Implications for Higher Learning 
What implications does this study present to higher learning?  What role do 
institutions of higher learning have in understanding how students grow, knowing what 
student groups are more likely to grow, and then using this knowledge to work with teacher 
trainees to leverage their instructional talents to maximize all student-learning outcomes?  
What responsibility do colleges and university researcher/instructors have in shaping public 
school curriculum and in instructing our future teachers to be the most impactful toward their 
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students’ learning?  The implications to the state of North Carolina concerning the findings in 
this research are wholly dependent on how it may be repeated on a macro-level.  If the 
findings of a state-level study were to yield similar results, especially with the SWD 
subgroup, the implications may be great on how teacher merit-based pay is structured in 
North Carolina. 
Implications for the Classroom 
The implication of this research on the classroom may be the most important 
revelation that comes from this research.  Most all research on the topic of student 
achievement cites the classroom teacher as the most important factor, that the school can 
control for, in determining student growth and achievement  (Sanders, 2003).  The teacher 
effect is more important than climate, principal effectiveness, class size, or curriculum 
(Sanders, Wright, & Horn, 1997; Teachers Matter, 2012).  EVAAS creates for teachers 
individual diagnostic reports that illustrate how effective teachers are at serving the tertiles of 
learners in a teacher’s classroom, and the different subgroups of students in those classrooms 
(Table 5.2).  How will the classroom teacher use this personalized EVAAS reporting data to 
inform their instructional strategies going forward based on the findings in this research?  An 
understanding of instructional strategies, student learning-styles, and differentiated learning 
must be part of the professional development offerings for teachers that serve students with 
learning disabilities.  I would hope that good teachers with classroom experience do not 
request that students with disabilities be excluded from their classrooms.  However, with the 
incentives of the merit-based pay legislation, these students seem to disadvantage teachers’ 
likelihood of receiving the bonus.  Principals, district administrators, and teachers must work 
together to do what is best for students while keeping in mind the implications of merit-based 
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pay for effective teachers in the affected grades.  The problem of student to teacher 
classroom assignment is a complex one. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Logistical regression models tend to ignore collinearity issues amongst variables.  
Although outside the scope of this exploratory research, the relationship between ELL and 
SES variables are great, as is the relationship between the SWD and White predictor variables.  
Both these sets of variables’ relationships would prove to have high levels of collinearity that 
might be meted out if these variables were regressed independently against the dependent 
variables.  An understanding of how these predictor variables are correlated to the 
dependents without the collinearity issues associated with some logistic regression models 
would be beneficial in a future study.  
In light of North Carolina’s merit-based teacher compensation legislation, a study like 
this one that encompasses data from all across the state of North Carolina is important to 
conduct.  Just as school systems and private industries undergo exhaustive program 
evaluations to discover if they are getting the results they desired after implementing a 
particular program, the state of North Carolina, if it is truly interested to see if the merit-
based pay program is fair and valid, should undergo a macro-level study with a similar 
methodology to the one conducted in the local LEA I researched.   
In a parallel setting, I would be interested in seeing the results of a similar study from 
other regions of the state to see what predictor variables they find to be significant and 
impactful in predicting teacher merit pay opportunities.  As mentioned earlier, repeating this 
study where geography, population, culture, and socio-economic factors are different from 
the rural western North Carolina county where this study was completed would be valuable 
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to policy-makers.  If this same study were completed a year from now in the same LEA, 
would the results be the same?  If not, what implications would this have for the LEA, for the 
EVAAS model and merit-based pay systems in general? 
Finally, I think there is value in doing a mixed methods study that combines 
interviews and surveys of principals to find out their student-to-teacher assignment practices 
married with the exploratory quantitative research methodology used in this study.  Do 
principals “reward” staff with students more likely to assist their teachers in earning the 
bonus?  Do they use other student-to-teacher assignment practices designed to match teacher 
strengths and student needs?  The qualitative component of that study may go far to inform 
the procedures and policies a school system should consider going forward when it comes to 
assigning students to classrooms. 
Concluding Thoughts 
 I continue to have trepidation over how the EVAAS tool is being used by school and 
district administrators to make high stakes decisions in North Carolina and other states where 
the VAM model is used.  If teachers have questions about the validity of the model and the 
high stakes decisions it is being used for, their concerns are valid.  Since most research finds 
almost no link between a teacher’s degrees earned and the performance of the students in her 
classroom, the state discontinued the practice of compensating teachers for advanced degrees 
for those earned after 2016.  This gave the state a degree of flexibility to put more money 
into merit-based pay.  Much of the research referenced in this study though casts a great 
cloud of doubt over the inherent fairness of VAM models to make high stakes decisions.  Is 
there a way to triangulate the findings of exploratory quantitative studies like this one and 
qualitative study findings about principal student assignment practices to develop a pay plan 
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that encourages and rewards effective teaching while allowing for the disadvantages that 
certain student groups may cause for teacher EVAAS scores?   
Can more complex models that combine principal evaluations, student growth 
(EVAAS), and student characteristics be developed so that no teacher is disadvantaged by the 
communities where they serve, the schools where they work, and the children that they teach.  
I hope that the state of North Carolina can address the issues raised by my research.  The 
EVAAS tool offers some valuable information to principals and teachers about how to 
improve their teaching.  The idea of merit-based pay appeals to me as I am sure it does most 
tax payers who would agree that it is a worthwhile endeavor to create policy that rewards 
those teachers that most positively effect student learning.  However, EVAAS was not 
designed for these high stakes decisions like teacher compensation and the problems this 
study has revealed are a testament to the concerns of its creator. 
Legal Issues 
From a legal standpoint, if this research is indeed generalizable, the state of North 
Carolina may have to face challenges in court based on property rights and due process 
charges.  In Trout v. Knox County Board of Education, the plaintiffs argued that TVAAS 
was arbitrary and capricious and too imprecise to be used to assess teacher effectiveness and 
deny them a bonus (Paige, Amrein-Beardsley, & Close, 2019).  The federal district court was 
sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ charge insofar as the VAM they claimed was marked with 
statistical inadequacies.  However, the court ultimately ruled on the side of the government 
over the claims of the plaintiffs (Paige, Amrein-Beardsley, & Close, 2019).  On closer 
inspection, this case did not have the statistical specificity that my research provides for 
North Carolina teachers.  Because the bonuses are applied to so few of North Carolina’s 
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public school teachers, and because many North Carolina public school teachers teach 
outside the merit pay subject areas, and because of the high stakes nature of the merit-based 
system, I foresee a challenge by the North Carolina Association of Educators or even by 
individual teachers in a state court over what they perceive as an unfair allocation of pay 
based on a flawed VAM model, EVAAS.   
Ethical Issues 
Measuring teacher efficacy is a complex issue, and an ethical one, that does not 
present an easy solution.  How should the state honor the hard work of its teachers without a 
system that objectively measures the impact they have on their students’ learning?  
Notwithstanding the merit-based pay problems this study has revealed, school systems will 
need to investigate inclusion and “pull out” models of special education instruction.  
Ethically, it is paramount that schools find which instructional models offer students the best 
chances to be successful, and that offer their teachers the best opportunity to show the growth 
necessary to receive merit-based pay. 
Questions Unanswered 
I have several unanswered questions about what the teacher accountability growth 
estimate or index is actually measuring.  Since it is being used to evaluate effective teachers 
worthy of bonuses, answers to these questions are paramount to understanding the validity of 
the merit pay initiatives in the state.  Although many of these questions fall outside the scope 
of my research, these queries may inform future mixed method research concerning the 
validity of the EVAAS measurement tool in North Carolina and other places the SAS tool is 
utilized.  This series of questions raises concerns and identifies weaknesses inherent in the 
EVAAS model. 
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• Is the EVAAS teacher index measuring a teacher’s impact on her student’s learning 
or the impact of classroom peer effects on that child’s learning?   
• Is the index measuring the teacher’s effectiveness or the principal’s non-random 
student assignment practices?   
• Is the growth estimate a legitimate reflection of teacher impact or a manifestation of 
the ceiling effect?   
• Is the EVAAS index a representation of a teacher’s effectiveness or the result of her 
serving the special education cluster in her grade level?   
• Is EVAAS measuring teacher impact or the impact of the tutor that works three nights 
a week with the student?   
• Is the teacher accountability growth measure evaluating a teacher’s effect on student 
learning or the recent life change the child has suffered during her parents’ divorce? 
In addition to the measurement issues raised by these questions, the reality of a 
teacher’s EVAAS growth index calculation is that it is not capable of separating out what 
part of the child’s learning a teacher is responsible for when an effective and ineffective 
teacher both provide reading or math instruction to a child (spillage).  However, when I 
consider my reservations toward placing worth in the VAM instrument, I remember the 
words of Winston Churchill and what he had to say about democracy.  The English prime 
minister offered for consideration the idea that democracy was the worst form of government 
except for all the others.  As an evaluation tool of teacher effectiveness, EVAAS may be the 
most objective tool we currently have in education to evaluate teacher impact.  In other 
words, it may be the worst tool we have to measure teacher effectiveness… except for all the 
others.   
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Despite my cognitive wavering about the use of EVAAS for high stakes decisions 
like merit pay, and although it may be the best tool we currently have to measure teacher 
effectiveness, I cannot say that it is the fairest method by which to assign teacher bonuses 
based on the findings in this research.   
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APPENDIX A 
THREE CATEGORIES OF GROWTH MODELS 
 
SIMPLE GROWTH (Similar to EVAAS multi-variate model for EOGs) 
 
Function – Measures difference in student’s scale scores from year to year  
 
Usage – Can be used to calculate school, district, and state growth  
 
GROWTH-TO-STANDARD  
 
Function – Shows if students are on track to meet proficiency standards  
 
Usage – Can be used to calculate school, district, and state growth and 
  proficiency  
 
PROJECTION (EVAAS univariate model for EOC and NCFE end of year exams) 
 
Function – Predicts students’ academic levels based on previous test scores  
 
Usage – Can be used to calculate growth and proficiency at the student, school, 
          district, and state levels 
 
* Exerpted from The Evolution & Use of Growth Models 
Christopher A. Cody, Joel McFarland, J. Eric Morre, & Jennifer Preston, 2010 
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APPENDIX B 
TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS 
 
Per federal requirements, the State must adopt definitions of effective and highly 
effective teachers. 
 
A highly effective teacher is one who receives a rating of at least “accomplished” on each of 
the Teacher Evaluation Standards 1 - 5 and receives a rating of “exceeds expected growth” 
on Standard 6 of the Teacher Evaluation Instrument.  The End-of-Course assessments, End-
of-Grade assessments, Career and Technical Education Post-Assessments, and the Measures 
of Student Learning provide the student data used to calculate the growth value. 
 
An effective teacher is one who receives a rating of at least “proficient” on each of the 
Teacher Evaluation Standards 1-5 and receives a rating of at least “meets expected growth” 
on Standard 6 of the Teacher Evaluation Instrument. 
 
A teacher in need of improvement is one who fails to receive a rating of at least “proficient” 
on each of the Teacher Evaluation Standards 1-5 or receives a rating of “does not meet 
expected growth” on Standard 6 of the Teacher Evaluation Instrument. 
 
A three-year rolling average of student growth values generates the sixth standard rating used 
to determine teacher effectiveness.  Only student growth values based on the individual 
students taught by a teacher will be used to determine the three-year rolling average for that 
teacher. 
 
* Excerpted from: http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/effectiveness-
model/ncees/standards/prof-teach-standards.pdf 
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APPENDIX C 
EVAAS Growth Indexes: Defining Teacher Effectiveness in terms of standard errors 
 
Value Added Color 
and Teacher 
Measure 
Designation 
Growth Measure 
Compared to the 
Growth Standard 
Index* Interpretation 
 
Exceeds Expected 
Growth  
At least 2 standard 
errors above 
2.00 or 
greater 
Significant evidence that 
students made more 
progress than the Growth 
Standard 
 
Meets Expected 
Growth 
Between 2 standard 
errors above and 2 
standard errors 
below 
Between -
2.00 and 
2.00 
Evidence that students 
made progress similar to 
the Growth Standard 
 
Does Not Meet 
Expected Growth 
More than 2 
standard errors 
below 
Less than -
2.00 
Significant evidence that 
students made less progress 
than the Growth Standard 
Note: When an index falls exactly on the boundary between two colors, the higher growth 
color is assigned. 
*These rules for effectiveness levels and growth colors apply to all index values in the 
district, school, and teacher reports 
 
** Excerpted from North Carolina Department of Public Instruction: Technical 
Documentation for 2016 EVAAS Analyses https://ncdpi.sas.com/support/EVAAS-NC-
TechnicalDocumentation-2016.pdf 
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APPENDIX D 
2018-2019 North Carolina Bachelor’s Degree Certified Teacher Salary Schedule 
(Effective July 1, 2018) 
 
Years of Experience 
Monthly Salary (10 months) Annual Salary 
0 $3500 $35,000 
1 $3600 $36,000 
2 $3700 $37,000 
3 $3800 $38,000 
4 $3900 $39,000 
5 $4000 $40,000 
6 $4100 $41,000 
7 $4200 $42,000 
8 $4300 $43,000 
9 $4400 $44,000 
10 $4500 $45,000 
11 $4600 $46,000 
12 $4700 $47,000 
13 $4800 $48,000 
14 $4900 $49,000 
15 - 24 $5000 $50,000 
25+ $5200 $52,000 
* Excerpted from Fiscal Year 2018 - 2019 North Carolina Public School Salary Schedules at 
www.ncpublicschools.org/fbs/finance/salary/ Financial & Business Services NC Department 
of Public Instruction 
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APPENDIX E 
Binary Logistic Regression – Grades 3-5 Reading 
Dependent Variable Bonus Coded as 1: (RDGB _1) 
 
Case Processing Summary 
   Unweighted Casesa N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 2925 76.7 
Missing Cases 891 23.3 
Total 3816 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 3816 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
.00 0 
1.00 1 
 
Block 0: Beginning Block 
Classification Tablea,b 
 
Observed 
 
 RDGB_1        Predicted 
Percentage 
Correct 
 
.00 1.00 
Step 0 RDGB_1 .00 1578 0 100.0 
1.00 1347 0 .0 
Overall Percentage 
  
53.9 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
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Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -.158 .037 18.205 1 .000 .854 
 
Variables not in the Equationa 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables Asian 1.963 1 .161 
Black 10.804 1 .001 
Hispanic 39.054 1 .000 
Indian .013 1 .911 
Mixed 1.859 1 .173 
White 41.138 1 .000 
PacificIs .013 1 .911 
F 1.286 1 .257 
M 1.286 1 .257 
AIG 4.096 1 .043 
SWD 8.526 1 .004 
SES 3.635 1 .057 
ELL 10.521 1 .001 
a. Residual Chi-Squares are not computed because of redundancies. 
 
Block 1: Method = Forward Stepwise (Conditional) 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 41.447 1 .000 
Block 41.447 1 .000 
Model 41.447 1 .000 
Step 2 Step 15.507 1 .000 
Block 56.954 2 .000 
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Model 56.954 2 .000 
Step 3 Step 9.059 1 .003 
Block 66.013 3 .000 
Model 66.013 3 .000 
Step 4 Step 4.215 1 .040 
Block 70.228 4 .000 
Model 70.228 4 .000 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 3995.202a .014 .019 
2 3979.695a .019 .026 
3 3970.636a .022 .030 
4 3966.421a .024 .032 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because parameter 
estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
Classification Tablea 
 
Observed 
 
 RDGB_1      Predicted 
Percentage 
Correct 
 
.00 1.00 
Step 1 RDGB_1 .00 631 947 40.0 
1.00 386 961 71.3 
Overall Percentage   54.4 
Step 2 RDGB_1 .00 544 1034 34.5 
1.00 295 1052 78.1 
Overall Percentage   54.6 
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Step 3 RDGB_1 .00 756 822 47.9 
1.00 462 885 65.7 
Overall Percentage   56.1 
Step 4 RDGB_1 .00 756 822 47.9 
1.00 462 885 65.7 
Overall Percentage   56.1 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a White .506 .079 40.845 1 .000 1.659 
Constant -.491 .065 57.848 1 .000 .612 
Step 2b Asian .657 .166 15.573 1 .000 1.929 
White .627 .086 53.612 1 .000 1.871 
Constant -.612 .072 71.635 1 .000 .542 
Step 3c Asian .642 .167 14.825 1 .000 1.900 
White .632 .086 54.363 1 .000 1.882 
SWD -.296 .099 8.963 1 .003 .744 
Constant -.562 .074 57.495 1 .000 .570 
Step 4d Asian .723 .172 17.751 1 .000 2.062 
Mixed .351 .170 4.265 1 .039 1.420 
White .714 .095 56.327 1 .000 2.042 
SWD -.301 .099 9.245 1 .002 .740 
Constant -.643 .085 57.765 1 .000 .526 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: White. 
b. Variable(s) entered on step 2: Asian. 
c. Variable(s) entered on step 3: SWD. 
d. Variable(s) entered on step 4: Mixed. 
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Model if Term Removeda 
Variable 
Model Log 
Likelihood 
Change in -2 Log 
Likelihood df 
Sig. of the 
Change 
Step 1 White -2018.330 41.457 1 .000 
Step 2 Asian -1997.602 15.510 1 .000 
White -2017.362 55.030 1 .000 
Step 3 Asian -1992.702 14.769 1 .000 
White -2013.230 55.823 1 .000 
SWD -1989.848 9.060 1 .003 
Step 4 Asian -1992.066 17.711 1 .000 
Mixed -1985.319 4.217 1 .040 
White -2012.476 58.531 1 .000 
SWD -1987.883 9.345 1 .002 
a. Based on conditional parameter estimates 
 
Variables not in the Equationa 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 1 Variables Asian 15.889 1 .000 
Black 2.218 1 .136 
Hispanic 8.432 1 .004 
Indian .123 1 .725 
Mixed 1.083 1 .298 
PacificIs .123 1 .725 
F .816 1 .366 
M .816 1 .366 
AIG 1.287 1 .257 
SWD 9.732 1 .002 
SES .000 1 .994 
ELL .091 1 .763 
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Step 2 Variables Black .654 1 .419 
Hispanic 1.439 1 .230 
Indian .194 1 .660 
Mixed 3.993 1 .046 
PacificIs .194 1 .660 
F 1.211 1 .271 
M 1.211 1 .271 
AIG 1.075 1 .300 
SWD 8.999 1 .003 
SES .082 1 .774 
ELL .316 1 .574 
Step 3 Variables Black .556 1 .456 
Hispanic 1.696 1 .193 
Indian .163 1 .687 
Mixed 4.287 1 .038 
PacificIs .163 1 .687 
F .549 1 .459 
M .549 1 .459 
AIG .252 1 .615 
SES .377 1 .539 
ELL .105 1 .746 
Step 4 Variables Black .077 1 .782 
Hispanic .021 1 .884 
Indian .215 1 .643 
PacificIs .215 1 .643 
F .642 1 .423 
M .642 1 .423 
AIG .199 1 .656 
SES .540 1 .463 
ELL .088 1 .766 
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APPENDIX F 
Binary Logistic Regression – Grades 3-5 Reading 
Dependent Variable Bonus Coded as 0: (RDGB _0) 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Casesa N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 2925 76.7 
Missing Cases 891 23.3 
Total 3816 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 3816 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
0 0 
1 1 
 
Block 0: Beginning Block 
Classification Tablea,b 
 
Observed 
  RDGB_0      Predicted 
Percentage 
Correct 
 
0 1 
Step 0 RDGB_0 0 0 1347 .0 
1 0 1578 100.0 
Overall Percentage   53.9 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
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Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant .158 .037 18.205 1 .000 1.171 
 
Variables not in the Equationa 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables Asian 1.963 1 .161 
Black 10.804 1 .001 
Hispanic 39.054 1 .000 
Indian .013 1 .911 
Mixed 1.859 1 .173 
White 41.138 1 .000 
PacificIs .013 1 .911 
F 1.286 1 .257 
M 1.286 1 .257 
AIG 4.096 1 .043 
SWD 8.526 1 .004 
SES 3.635 1 .057 
ELL 10.521 1 .001 
 
 
Block 1: Method = Forward Stepwise (Conditional) 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 41.447 1 .000 
Block 41.447 1 .000 
Model 41.447 1 .000 
Step 2 Step 15.507 1 .000 
Block 56.954 2 .000 
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Model 56.954 2 .000 
Step 3 Step 9.059 1 .003 
Block 66.013 3 .000 
Model 66.013 3 .000 
Step 4 Step 4.215 1 .040 
Block 70.228 4 .000 
Model 70.228 4 .000 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 3995.202
a .014 .019 
2 3979.695
a .019 .026 
3 3970.636
a .022 .030 
4 3966.421
a .024 .032 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because parameter 
estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
Classification Tablea 
 
Observed 
  RDGB_0      Predicted 
Percentage 
Correct 
 
0 1 
Step 1 RDGB_0 0 961 386 71.3 
1 947 631 40.0 
Overall Percentage   54.4 
Step 2 RDGB_0 0 1052 295 78.1 
1 1034 544 34.5 
Overall Percentage   54.6 
Step 3 RDGB_0 0 885 
462 
65.7 
1 822 756 47.9 
Overall Percentage   56.1 
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Step 4 RDGB_0 0 885 462 65.7 
1 822 756 47.9 
Overall Percentage   56.1 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a White -.506 .079 40.845 1 .000 .603 
Constant .491 .065 57.848 1 .000 1.635 
Step 2b Asian -.657 .166 15.573 1 .000 .518 
White -.627 .086 53.612 1 .000 .534 
Constant .612 .072 71.635 1 .000 1.844 
Step 3c Asian -.642 .167 14.825 1 .000 .526 
White -.632 .086 54.363 1 .000 .531 
SWD .296 .099 8.963 1 .003 1.344 
Constant .562 .074 57.495 1 .000 1.754 
Step 4d Asian -.723 .172 17.751 1 .000 .485 
Mixed -.351 .170 4.265 1 .039 .704 
White -.714 .095 56.327 1 .000 .490 
SWD .301 .099 9.245 1 .002 1.351 
Constant .643 .085 57.765 1 .000 1.902 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: White. 
b. Variable(s) entered on step 2: Asian. 
c. Variable(s) entered on step 3: SWD. 
d. Variable(s) entered on step 4: Mixed. 
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Model if Term Removeda 
Variable 
Model Log 
Likelihood 
Change in -2 Log 
Likelihood df 
Sig. of the 
Change 
Step 1 White -2018.330 41.457 1 .000 
Step 2 Asian -1997.602 15.510 1 .000 
White -2017.362 55.030 1 .000 
Step 3 Asian -1992.702 14.769 1 .000 
White -2013.230 55.823 1 .000 
SWD -1989.848 9.060 1 .003 
Step 4 Asian -1992.066 17.711 1 .000 
Mixed -1985.319 4.217 1 .040 
White -2012.476 58.531 1 .000 
SWD -1987.883 9.345 1 .002 
a. Based on conditional parameter estimates 
 
Variables not in the Equationa 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 1 Variables Asian 15.889 1 .000 
Black 2.218 1 .136 
Hispanic 8.432 1 .004 
Indian .123 1 .725 
Mixed 1.083 1 .298 
PacificIs .123 1 .725 
F .816 1 .366 
M .816 1 .366 
AIG 1.287 1 .257 
SWD 9.732 1 .002 
SES .000 1 .994 
ELL .091 1 .763 
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Step 2 Variables Black .654 1 .419 
Hispanic 1.439 1 .230 
Indian .194 1 .660 
Mixed 3.993 1 .046 
PacificIs .194 1 .660 
F 1.211 1 .271 
M 1.211 1 .271 
AIG 1.075 1 .300 
SWD 8.999 1 .003 
SES .082 1 .774 
ELL .316 1 .574 
Step 3 Variables Black .556 1 .456 
Hispanic 1.696 1 .193 
Indian .163 1 .687 
Mixed 4.287 1 .038 
PacificIs .163 1 .687 
F .549 1 .459 
M .549 1 .459 
AIG .252 1 .615 
SES .377 1 .539 
ELL .105 1 .746 
Step 4 Variables Black .077 1 .782 
Hispanic .021 1 .884 
Indian .215 1 .643 
PacificIs .215 1 .643 
F .642 1 .423 
M .642 1 .423 
AIG .199 1 .656 
SES .540 1 .463 
ELL .088 1 .766 
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Appendix G – Binary Logistic Regression – Grades 4-8 Math 
Dependent Variable Bonus Coded as 1: (MTHB _1) 
 
Logistic Regression 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Casesa N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 4490 100.0 
Missing Cases 1 .0 
Total 4491 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 4491 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases. 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
.00 0 
1.00 1 
 
Block 0: Beginning Block 
Classification Tablea,b 
 
Observed 
 
 MTHB_1           Predicted 
Percentage Correct 
 
.00 1.00 
Step 0 MTHB_1 .00 2738 0 100.0 
1.00 1752 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   61.0 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -.446 .031 212.964 1 .000 .640 
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Variables not in the Equationa 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables Asian 1.335 1 .248 
Black 7.762 1 .005 
Hispanic 5.130 1 .024 
Indian .964 1 .326 
Mixed 2.414 1 .120 
White 10.520 1 .001 
PacificIs .322 1 .571 
F .113 1 .737 
M .113 1 .737 
AIG 6.612 1 .010 
SWD 13.993 1 .000 
SES 4.754 1 .029 
ELL .642 1 .423 
a. Residual Chi-Squares are not computed because of redundancies. 
 
Block 1: Method = Forward Stepwise (Conditional) 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 14.249 1 .000 
Block 14.249 1 .000 
Model 14.249 1 .000 
Step 2 Step 11.577 1 .001 
Block 25.826 2 .000 
Model 25.826 2 .000 
Step 3 Step 7.919 1 .005 
Block 33.745 3 .000 
Model 33.745 3 .000 
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Step 4 Step 4.171 1 .041 
Block 37.916 4 .000 
Model 37.916 4 .000 
Step 5 Step 3.867 1 .049 
Block 41.783 5 .000 
Model 41.783 5 .000 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 5991.913a .003 .004 
2 5980.337a .006 .008 
3 5972.417a .007 .010 
4 5968.246a .008 .011 
5 5964.379a .009 .013 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because parameter estimates 
changed by less than .001. 
 
Classification Tablea 
 
Observed 
 
 MTHB_1          Predicted 
Percentage Correct 
 
.00 1.00 
Step 1 MTHB_1 .00 2738 0 100.0 
1.00 1752 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   61.0 
Step 2 MTHB_1 .00 2738 0 100.0 
1.00 1752 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   61.0 
Step 3 MTHB_1 .00 2670 68 97.5 
1.00 1684 68 3.9 
Overall Percentage   61.0 
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Step 4 MTHB_1 .00 2670 68 97.5 
1.00 1684 68 3.9 
Overall Percentage   61.0 
Step 5 MTHB_1 .00 2670 68 97.5 
1.00 1684 68 3.9 
Overall Percentage   61.0 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a SWD -.320 .086 13.918 1 .000 .727 
Constant -.396 .033 142.121 1 .000 .673 
Step 2b AIG -.272 .080 11.411 1 .001 .762 
SWD -.377 .087 18.670 1 .000 .686 
Constant -.336 .038 79.917 1 .000 .715 
Step 3c Black .408 .144 7.993 1 .005 1.504 
AIG -.259 .081 10.368 1 .001 .771 
SWD -.390 .088 19.823 1 .000 .677 
Constant -.356 .038 86.346 1 .000 .701 
Step 4d Black .440 .145 9.205 1 .002 1.553 
Hispanic .166 .081 4.195 1 .041 1.181 
AIG -.238 .081 8.571 1 .003 .788 
SWD -.381 .088 18.877 1 .000 .683 
Constant -.392 .042 85.967 1 .000 .676 
Step 5e Black .462 .146 10.079 1 .001 1.588 
Hispanic .188 .082 5.255 1 .022 1.207 
Mixed .248 .125 3.908 1 .048 1.281 
AIG -.231 .081 8.036 1 .005 .794 
SWD -.382 .088 18.927 1 .000 .683 
Constant -.414 .044 89.377 1 .000 .661 
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a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: SWD. 
b. Variable(s) entered on step 2: AIG. 
c. Variable(s) entered on step 3: Black. 
d. Variable(s) entered on step 4: Hispanic. 
e. Variable(s) entered on step 5: Mixed. 
 
Model if Term Removeda 
Variable 
Model Log 
Likelihood 
Change in -2 Log 
Likelihood df Sig. of the Change 
Step 1 SWD -3003.083 14.253 1 .000 
Step 2 AIG -2995.958 11.579 1 .001 
SWD -2999.746 19.155 1 .000 
Step 3 Black -2990.168 7.920 1 .005 
AIG -2991.465 10.513 1 .001 
SWD -2996.388 20.358 1 .000 
Step 4 Black -2988.679 9.113 1 .003 
Hispanic -2986.209 4.172 1 .041 
AIG -2988.461 8.675 1 .003 
SWD -2993.808 19.370 1 .000 
Step 5 Black -2987.176 9.972 1 .002 
Hispanic -2984.802 5.224 1 .022 
Mixed -2984.123 3.867 1 .049 
AIG -2986.254 8.129 1 .004 
SWD -2991.900 19.422 1 .000 
a. Based on conditional parameter estimates 
 
Variables not in the Equationa 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 1 Variables Asian 1.727 1 .189 
Black 9.200 1 .002 
Hispanic 4.606 1 .032 
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Indian .874 1 .350 
Mixed 2.561 1 .110 
White 10.141 1 .001 
PacificIs .396 1 .529 
F .008 1 .928 
M .008 1 .928 
AIG 11.447 1 .001 
SES 6.149 1 .013 
ELL 1.471 1 .225 
Step 2 Variables Asian 2.064 1 .151 
Black 8.086 1 .004 
Hispanic 2.996 1 .083 
Indian .928 1 .335 
Mixed 2.288 1 .130 
White 7.219 1 .007 
PacificIs .433 1 .511 
F .006 1 .939 
M .006 1 .939 
SES 3.679 1 .055 
ELL .729 1 .393 
Step 3 Variables Asian 1.644 1 .200 
Hispanic 4.200 1 .040 
Indian .956 1 .328 
Mixed 2.849 1 .091 
White 3.746 1 .053 
PacificIs .404 1 .525 
F .003 1 .958 
M .003 1 .958 
SES 3.237 1 .072 
ELL 1.135 1 .287 
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Step 4 Variables Asian 1.047 1 .306 
Indian 1.012 1 .315 
Mixed 3.924 1 .048 
White .527 1 .468 
PacificIs .353 1 .552 
F .003 1 .958 
M .003 1 .958 
SES 1.770 1 .183 
ELL .050 1 .824 
Step 5 Variables Asian .723 1 .395 
Indian 1.050 1 .305 
White .673 1 .412 
PacificIs .323 1 .570 
F .004 1 .950 
M .004 1 .950 
SES 1.481 1 .224 
ELL .069 1 .793 
a. Residual Chi-Squares are not computed because of redundancies. 
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APPENDIX H 
Binary Logistic Regression – Grades 4-8 Math 
Dependent Variable Bonus Coded as 0: (MTHB _0) 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Casesa N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 4490 100.0 
Missing Cases 1 .0 
Total 4491 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 4491 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
0 0 
1 1 
 
Block 0: Beginning Block 
 
Classification Tablea,b 
 
Observed 
 
 MTHB_0        Predicted 
Percentage Correct 
 
0 1 
Step 0 MTHB_0 0 0 1752 .0 
1 0 2738 100.0 
Overall Percentage   61.0 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant .446 .031 212.964 1 .000 1.563 
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Variables not in the Equationa 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables Asian 1.335 1 .248 
Black 7.762 1 .005 
Hispanic 5.130 1 .024 
Indian .964 1 .326 
Mixed 2.414 1 .120 
White 10.520 1 .001 
PacificIs .322 1 .571 
F .113 1 .737 
M .113 1 .737 
AIG 6.612 1 .010 
SWD 13.993 1 .000 
SES 4.754 1 .029 
ELL .642 1 .423 
a. Residual Chi-Squares are not computed because of redundancies. 
 
Block 1: Method = Forward Stepwise (Conditional) 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 14.249 1 .000 
Block 14.249 1 .000 
Model 14.249 1 .000 
Step 2 Step 11.577 1 .001 
Block 25.826 2 .000 
Model 25.826 2 .000 
Step 3 Step 7.919 1 .005 
Block 33.745 3 .000 
Model 33.745 3 .000 
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Step 4 Step 4.171 1 .041 
Block 37.916 4 .000 
Model 37.916 4 .000 
Step 5 Step 3.867 1 .049 
Block 41.783 5 .000 
Model 41.783 5 .000 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 5991.913a .003 .004 
2 5980.337a .006 .008 
3 5972.417a .007 .010 
4 5968.246a .008 .011 
5 5964.379a .009 .013 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because parameter estimates 
changed by less than .001. 
 
Classification Tablea 
 
Observed 
 
 
MTHB              Predicted 
Percentage Correct 
 
0 1 
Step 1 MTHB 0 0 1752 .0 
1 0 2738 100.0 
Overall Percentage   61.0 
Step 2 MTHB 0 0 1752 .0 
1 0 2738 100.0 
Overall Percentage   61.0 
Step 3 MTHB 0 68 1684 3.9 
1 68 2670 97.5 
Overall Percentage   61.0 
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Step 4 MTHB 0 68 1684 3.9 
1 68 2670 97.5 
Overall Percentage   61.0 
Step 5 MTHB 0 68 1684 3.9 
1 68 2670 97.5 
Overall Percentage   61.0 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a SWD .320 .086 13.918 1 .000 1.376 
Constant .396 .033 142.121 1 .000 1.486 
Step 2b AIG .272 .080 11.411 1 .001 1.312 
SWD .377 .087 18.670 1 .000 1.458 
Constant .336 .038 79.917 1 .000 1.399 
Step 3c Black -.408 .144 7.993 1 .005 .665 
AIG .259 .081 10.368 1 .001 1.296 
SWD .390 .088 19.823 1 .000 1.476 
Constant .356 .038 86.346 1 .000 1.427 
Step 4d Black -.440 .145 9.205 1 .002 .644 
Hispanic -.166 .081 4.195 1 .041 .847 
AIG .238 .081 8.571 1 .003 1.269 
SWD .381 .088 18.877 1 .000 1.464 
Constant .392 .042 85.967 1 .000 1.480 
Step 5e Black -.462 .146 10.079 1 .001 .630 
Hispanic -.188 .082 5.255 1 .022 .829 
Mixed -.248 .125 3.908 1 .048 .781 
AIG .231 .081 8.036 1 .005 1.260 
SWD .382 .088 18.927 1 .000 1.465 
Constant .414 .044 89.377 1 .000 1.513 
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a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: SWD. 
b. Variable(s) entered on step 2: AIG. 
c. Variable(s) entered on step 3: Black. 
d. Variable(s) entered on step 4: Hispanic. 
e. Variable(s) entered on step 5: Mixed. 
 
Model if Term Removeda 
Variable 
Model Log 
Likelihood 
Change in -2 Log 
Likelihood df Sig. of the Change 
Step 1 SWD -3003.083 14.253 1 .000 
Step 2 AIG -2995.958 11.579 1 .001 
SWD -2999.746 19.155 1 .000 
Step 3 Black -2990.168 7.920 1 .005 
AIG -2991.465 10.513 1 .001 
SWD -2996.388 20.358 1 .000 
Step 4 Black -2988.679 9.113 1 .003 
Hispanic -2986.209 4.172 1 .041 
AIG -2988.461 8.675 1 .003 
SWD -2993.808 19.370 1 .000 
Step 5 Black -2987.176 9.972 1 .002 
Hispanic -2984.802 5.224 1 .022 
Mixed -2984.123 3.867 1 .049 
AIG -2986.254 8.129 1 .004 
SWD -2991.900 19.422 1 .000 
a. Based on conditional parameter estimates 
 
Variables not in the Equationa 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 1 Variables Asian 1.727 1 .189 
Black 9.200 1 .002 
Hispanic 4.606 1 .032 
 
	 151	
Indian .874 1 .350 
Mixed 2.561 1 .110 
White 10.141 1 .001 
PacificIs .396 1 .529 
F .008 1 .928 
M .008 1 .928 
AIG 11.447 1 .001 
SES 6.149 1 .013 
ELL 1.471 1 .225 
Step 2 Variables Asian 2.064 1 .151 
Black 8.086 1 .004 
Hispanic 2.996 1 .083 
Indian .928 1 .335 
Mixed 2.288 1 .130 
White 7.219 1 .007 
PacificIs .433 1 .511 
F .006 1 .939 
M .006 1 .939 
SES 3.679 1 .055 
ELL .729 1 .393 
Step 3 Variables Asian 1.644 1 .200 
Hispanic 4.200 1 .040 
Indian .956 1 .328 
Mixed 2.849 1 .091 
White 3.746 1 .053 
PacificIs .404 1 .525 
F .003 1 .958 
M .003 1 .958 
SES 3.237 1 .072 
ELL 1.135 1 .287 
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Step 4 Variables Asian 1.047 1 .306 
Indian 1.012 1 .315 
Mixed 3.924 1 .048 
White .527 1 .468 
PacificIs .353 1 .552 
F .003 1 .958 
M .003 1 .958 
SES 1.770 1 .183 
ELL .050 1 .824 
Step 5 Variables Asian .723 1 .395 
Indian 1.050 1 .305 
White .673 1 .412 
PacificIs .323 1 .570 
F .004 1 .950 
M .004 1 .950 
SES 1.481 1 .224 
ELL .069 1 .793 
a. Residual Chi-Squares are not computed because of redundancies. 
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APPENDIX I 
Letter of Agreement for the Use of Student Data 
June 1, 2019  
To the Appalachian Institutional Review Board (IRB):  I am familiar with Ross Rumbaugh’s 
research project entitled: TEACHER MERIT PAY IN A RURAL WESTERN NORTH 
CAROLINA COUNTY: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF 
STUDENT CHARACTERISTICS ON A TEACHER’S LIKELIHOOD OF RECEIVING A 
MONETARY BONUS IN MATH OR READING IN GRADES THREE - EIGHT 
I understand that student data will be used for this research project. 
Student data will be collected from the Secure Shell data base that houses data on tested 
students in North Carolina’s public schools.  The following data will be collected on all 
students in grades 3-8 that participated in end of grade math and reading testing in the 2017-
2018 school year. 
Ethnicity – Asian students, African Americans, Hispanic, Mixed Race, Pacific 
Islander, White. 
Socio-economic level – The data available for this characteristic is dependent on the 
child’s participation in the free and reduced lunch program.   
Sex – Male or Female (as indicated by parents on student data sheets) 
English as a second language program participant – Student participation in the 
English as a Second Language or EL program. 
Academically and intellectually gifted – Students participating in the AIG program. 
Exceptional children’s program participants – Students served by the special 
education program. 
   
The following will be collected from the school system’s finance department: 
Teachers receiving the merit based bonus– In North Carolina, the top 25% of 
teachers in grades four through eight received a bonus as a result of their students’ 
growing academically in math.  In grades three through five, the top 25% of teachers 
impacting student learning as measured by EVAAS also earned a bonus. 
I understand that the informed consent of the student for the use of their data for the research 
project will not be obtained for this research but consent for gathering the student data will be 
received from the system superintendent. 
As the research team conducts this research project the student data will be protected by: 
• The researcher will not be involved with collecting the data.  A testing and 
accountability assistant with the school system will gather the data and will mask 
all student and teacher names.   
• No data will be shared outside the research team including the testing assistant, 
Ross Rumbaugh (researcher), and Les Bolt (dissertation chair.)  In the case of Mr. 
Rumbaugh and Dr. Bolt, they will not see student names or student ID’s or teacher 
names as they will be removed before any statistical analysis is performed. 
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• This data can be found in the state’s Secure Shell file that can be accessed by 
certain public school officials and in PowerSchool which is available to teachers on 
a need-to-know basis.  However, the data compiled for the research will be 
electronically and physically deleted after the analysis of the data is complete.  
• The data will be stored securely on a school system laptop and backed up on thumb 
drive.  As previously noted, both electronic files will be deleted upon completion of 
the research with supervision of the superintendent of the county where the 
research is taking place.   
• No data will be shared outside the research team.  With the student names, student 
ID numbers, and teacher names removed, no additional identifying information 
will be seen relating to the study participants’ data.  
• The superintendent’s name and school system will be masked in the dissertation so 
that the school system will remain anonymous. 
Therefore, as a representative of Appalachian State University, I agree that Ross Rumbaugh’s 
research project may be conducted with the student data described above.  I understand that 
this research will be carried out following sound ethical principles and that it has been 
approved by the IRB at Appalachian State University. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Dr. Les Bolt, Dissertation Chair 
Appalachian State University 
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 Ross Rumbaugh was born in Lancaster, Pennsylvania to Ross R. and Sharon L. 
Rumbaugh.  He moved to North Carolina in 1988 to attend college at Wake Forest 
University.  He graduated from Wake Forest University in May of 1992 with a Bachelor of 
Arts degree with honors in Economics.  He received his teaching licensure from Winston-
Salem State University in May of 1995.  Additional degrees earned include a Masters of 
School Administration from Appalachian State University in May of 2003, and an 
Educational Specialist degree from ASU in May of 2012.  In that same year he began the 
pursuit of his Doctorate in Educational Leadership from Appalachian State University where 
he will finish in December of 2019.   
He has worked for 25 years in North Carolina’s public school system in the roles of 
teacher, coach, assistant principal, principal, Director of Administrative Services, and 
Assistant Superintendent.  He currently serves as the Director of Testing and Accountability 
for Burke County Public Schools in Morganton, North Carolina.   
Dr. Rumbaugh currently resides with his wife Marissa of 21 years and his children 
Ellie and Brittain Rumbaugh of whom he is most proud.  He serves as a deacon at Corinth 
Reformed Church in Hickory, North Carolina.  He also coaches basketball and lacrosse and 
provides basketball clinics for local youth coaches. 
 
